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Abstract 
 
 
This dissertation explores economic sanctions in an empirical political economy 
context. While consisting of three independent papers, it aims at providing a 
holistic understanding of the motivation and effects of sanctions in particular, 
and the interplay between economic incentives and political goals in general. My 
research delineates the economic constraints that policymakers encounter in the 
field of international relations.      
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Zusammenfassung 
 
 
Diese Dissertation untersucht ökonomische Sanktionen im Kontext der 
empirischen politischen Ökonomie. Obwohl sie aus drei unabhängigen Kapiteln 
besteht, ist das übergeordnete, verbindende Ziel dieser Forschungsarbeit ein  
Gesamtverständnis der Motivation und der Effekte von Sanktionen anzubieten, 
getragen von der generellen Idee der Wechselwirkungen zwischen ökonomischen 
Anreizen und politischen Zielen. Meine Forschung zeichnet die ökonomischen 
Restriktionen ab, mit denen sich die politischen Entscheidungsträger im Bereich 
der internationalen Beziehungen auseinandersetzen. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This dissertation studies three important questions in political economy: The 
targeted country voters’ reaction to sanctions, the importance of trade 
dependencies in the decision to intervene with sanctions in a human-rights 
violating country and the persistent effects which trade interruption has as a 
result of a sanction period. I study these questions empirically in three papers, 
two of them spanning the whole post-1945 world and one focusing on present-
day Russia. All three papers evolve around economic sanctions – what motivates 
them, what are their political consequences, and what are the (long-run) 
economic effects. 
The issue of economic sanctions is a relatively neglected problem in the 
economics literature. The political sciences have contributed most to our 
understanding of sanctions. Economic sanctions are seen as an alternative to the 
use of force in international relations. The reasoning behind the choice of 
sanctions as a policy tool is that they are believed to be able to change the 
behavior of another country, without causing the economic and human 
destruction, which a war involves. If that is indeed the case, then sanctions should 
be recommended as a useful foreign policy instrument. If not, then policymakers 
should be aware of the potential sanctions pitfalls. 
My research studies the deliberate or involuntary divergence between economic 
incentives and political goals in sanctions motivation and sanctions effects. Due 
to their design, sanctions impose some costs not only on the target but also on 
the sender. To what extent do these economic costs constrain the sanction sender 
in pursuing political goals? 
Sanctions’ main hope is to change the target’s policy, either through changing the 
domestic political balance in the target country or through the dissatisfaction of 
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the target country populace with its government due to the economic suffering 
caused by sanctions. Is that the case? What if sanctions’ economic costs induce 
an unexpected, unwanted reaction of unity and strengthening of the targeted 
regime? 
There is also substantial variation in the length of sanctions. At what point in 
time do sanctions change persistently and potentially irreversibly the economic 
relations between the sanctioner and the target? 
This thesis aims to understand not only the limits of political actions in the face 
of economic constraints but also how those economic constraints induce 
puzzling political realities. 
In Chapter 2, “Did sanctions help Putin?”, I examine the political consequences of 
sanction imposition on elections in Russia, between 2012 and 2018. In particular, 
I focus on the shock induced by the Western sanctions against Russia, which 
were adopted in 2014. Theoretical contributions from the public choice literature 
on sanctions conjecture that sanction imposition may prompt the target’s country 
citizens to “rally around the flag” by increasing their support for the regime 
(Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1988, 1992). While there exists case-study- and cross-
country-level evidence supporting these theoretical implications (Marinov, 2005; 
Takyeh and Maloney, 2011; Hirt, 2014), there has been no attempt at identifying 
the causal impact of sanctions on electoral outcomes.  
I construct a spatially varying measure of the sanction shock for each polling 
station in Russia. This measure utilizes the following pieces of information: (1) 
the exact geographic location of a sanctioned Russian firm and (2) the exact 
geographic location of each of the 90000 polling stations in Russia. I 
geographically match polling stations to sanctioned firms in their vicinity.  
In the first step of the analysis, I estimate the effect of the sanction shock on 
election outcomes across polling stations.  I implement a difference-in-difference 
estimator and compare polling stations which feature a sanctioned firm in close 
vicinity to polling stations which are not geographically close to any sanctioned 
firm. I investigate the impact of sanction imposition in 2014 on the change in 
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Putin’s vote share between 2012 and 2018. I find evidence that sanction 
imposition increased Putin’s electoral approval by 1.5 to 3.0 percentage points, 
depending on the specification. This shift is sizable compared to the 13.1 
percentage point overall shift in support for Putin between 2012 and 2018. 
Heterogeneity results suggest that these electoral responses are stronger at polling 
stations that show relatively low support for Putin in the 2012 presidential 
elections. 
In the second part of the paper, I deepen the analysis by exploring alternative 
explanations for the increased vote share in favor of Putin. In particular, I use 
finance data on the sanctioned firms to measure the impact of sanctions at the 
firm level. I explore if voters react to the loss of local jobs induced by sanctions. 
A lack of punitive reaction from voters in vicinity of sanctioned firms 
experiencing economic losses may indicate the acceptance of the narrative of 
Western responsibility and “rallying around the flag”. 
The findings have implications for the understanding the impact of modern-day 
“smart” sanctions that were precisely introduced with the goal to affect only 
specific groups related to the ruling elite and prevent unintended consequences.    
In Chapter 3, “Strategic goods trade bias in human rights sanctions”, I study the 
importance of trade for the decision to impose a sanction. Economic sanctions 
inflict a “deadweight loss of utility” due to lost welfare benefits for all the parties 
involved (Pape 1997, Eaton and Engers 1999, Drezner 2003). Specifically, 
sanctions may disrupt trade flows that are of importance to the countries 
involved (Hufbauer et. al. 1997). 
The literature studying the importance of trade for sanctions use does not speak 
with one voice. I attribute the difference in previous findings to the approach 
used to describe trade linkages. I claim that trade interdependence is more 
complex than the volume of bilateral trade employed in previous studies. This 
paper aims to bring clarity on the effect of trade on sanctions use by asking 
whether sanctions are less likely to be initiated when – inter alia – strategic 
economic relations between the potential sender country to the target country 
are stronger. In particular, I argue that human rights-concerned countries impose 
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sanction for human rights violations, but do so selectively. The countries that 
disregard human rights are sanctioned less often if they engage in trade in 
strategic goods, such as natural resources, armaments or high tech goods with 
the human rights-concerned countries. Variations in the degree to which 
countries that violate human rights import or export strategic goods explain the 
differing treatment with sanctions that result from comparable human rights 
violations. 
Using a country-pair panel of 43 sanctioning countries and 91 human rights-
violating countries between 1972 and 2005, I find strong evidence for selective 
human rights sanctions. Human-rights-abusing countries are less likely to be 
sanctioned if they import nuclear materials and armaments or export energy and 
nuclear products from potential sanction senders. Higher exports of chemicals 
and electronics as well as higher imports of chemicals increase the probability to 
be sanctioned by a human rights-concerned country. Being geopolitically closely 
aligned does not explain the impact of strategic goods trade on sanction initiation 
whereas trade interdependencies have explanatory power for some strategic 
goods. In particular, I find that strategic trade has a stronger effect on the use of 
sanctions for sanction senders that are more dependent on the potential target or 
that find it harder to substitute the trade relationship with the potential target. 
The logic behind these findings is that not every trade flow disruption has the 
same opportunity costs. 
In the last Chapter 4, “Sanctions effect persistence”, I investigate the impact of a 
sanction on target’s trade, with both the sender and other non-sanctioning 
countries, during and after the sanction period.  
Sanctions may disrupt the political and economic relations between the sender 
and the target. The reversibility of this disruption depends on the intensity of the 
sanction, but also on the sanction period and the availability of substitute trade 
partners. To the best of my knowledge, my research is novel in terms of trying 
to determine the persistent effect of an economic sanction on the bilateral trade 
relations between the parties involved. In this regard, my study adds to the well-
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established results by Nitsch and Wolf (2013) and Felbermayr and Gröschl (2014) 
that the recovery from trade disruption is a very long process. 
My results show that while sanction imposition depresses bilateral trade relations 
between sender and target, it does not decrease the target’s total trade. A 
sanctioned country is able, on average, to find other trade partners. In particular, 
it is not the geopolitically close countries that intensify their trade relations with 
the target but those countries, that seem to profit from the trade disruption 
between sender and target – the countries that have an export mix similar to the 
one of the sanction sender. Moreover, trade relations between the sender and 
target do not pick up even after the sanction has been lifted. The sender’s 
decision to sanction has persistent and equilibrium-changing effects on trade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 2: Did Sanctions Help Putin? 
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1. Introduction 
Do sanctions have an unaccounted for effect of strengthening the sanctioned 
regime? According to the public choice literature, sanctions can reduce the 
political resources of the ruling elites in the target country, thereby changing the 
domestic political equilibrium and bringing about a change in policy in the 
direction aimed by the sanction senders (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1988). 
Specifically, the regime’s opposition may be encouraged by foreign sanctions and 
their ability to mobilize people to collective actions against the government may 
increase, or regime supporters may turn away from the target country rulers in 
Do sanctions strengthen the targeted regime? I analyze the 2014 imposition of 
Western sanctions on Russia and its impact on voting. The US and the EU 
introduced targeted measures against Russian entities and individuals related to 
Putin’s regime. Using polling station-level data I investigate whether Putin gained 
relatively more support among those local constituencies which were geographically 
close to a sanctioned firm. I find a significant effect of targeted sanction imposition 
on the vote share in presidential elections between 2012 and 2018. Putin gained 
1.54 percentage points at those polling stations that had a sanctioned firm in 
immediate vicinity. Targeted sanctions imposition also affected voter turnout. The 
effect on voting can be explained as rally-around-the-flag in the face of sanctions, 
as long as voters did not endure economic losses through a decline in some sanctioned 
firms’ economic performance. 
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anticipation of a regime change (Kaempfer et. al., 2004). Alternatively, sanction 
imposition may induce the target country’s citizens to reject foreign inference by 
increasing their support for the rulers and thereby reinforcing the sanctioned 
policy or behavior, a phenomenon termed “rally-around-the-flag” (Kaempfer 
and Lowenberg, 1992). Aware of these potential unintended consequences, 
sanction policymakers in the last two decades have started applying so-called 
“smart” or “targeted” sanctions, i.e., sanction programs which meticulously 
target only a country’s ruler and her closest supporters (Tostensen, 2002; 
Drezner, 2011).  
Understanding the impact of this new type of sanctions is of interest not only for 
sanctions policymakers and the sanctions literature but also for models of 
political support and state legitimacy. And for those taking the decisions on 
sanctions, if smart sanctions increase the popular support of a targeted 
government, then sanctions in general may turn out to be an obsolete, ineffective 
foreign policy tool. 
In this paper, I empirically examine the effect of smart sanctions on the targeted 
country. In 2014, the EU and the US introduced sanctions against several 
hundreds of Russian entities and individuals.  I investigate the political 
consequences of these sanctions on elections in Russia, between 2012 and 2018. 
The targeted manner of sanctioning created substantial geographical variation in 
direct exposure to sanctions. Russians living close to and potentially working at 
sanctioned firms may have experienced sanctions in a different way than the 
average Russian citizen. Direct exposure to local sanctioned entities may have 
given rise to an identity- or economic-based reaction. The local presence of 
sanctioned firms may have induced defiant attitudes against foreign influence and 
awakened or strengthened ideas of nationalism or identity from which Putin’s 
support benefits (Pape, 1997). At the same time, sanctioned entities may have 
contributed to worsening local economic conditions, for which Western 
interference could be blamed. 
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This paper analyzes whether exposure to smart sanctions affects political support 
for the targeted regime. To do so, I assemble a panel of newly-collected polling 
station-level data on presidential elections and match it with geographical and 
financial data on sanctioned Russian firms. I then compare the change in Putin’s 
vote share between 2012 and 2018 for the polling stations that had a sanctioned 
firm in close vicinity after 2014’s sanctions imposition to those polling stations 
that did not. I find that local presence of a sanctioned firm significantly increased 
Putin’s vote share in the 2018 presidential elections by 1.54 percentage points. 
Since more than 11,000 polling stations (out of over 90,000) were close to at least 
one sanctioned firm in the 2018 elections, the estimated effect implies over 
280,000 influenced voters.  
In a second part of the analysis, I show that the effect of a nearby sanctioned 
firm varies with local support for Putin. The effect is particularly strong at those 
polling stations that are the most and the least supportive of Putin. Additionally, 
the presence of a sanctioned firm increased voter turnout at those polling stations 
where Putin enjoyed highest support. The impact of sanctions on voters seems 
to work, at least in part, through mobilization of nonvoters in pro-Putin areas.   
Pinpointing the precise mechanism that drives up Putin’s support at polling 
stations close to sanctioned firms is challenging due to the lack of disaggregated 
data on voter attitudes. To confront this challenge, this paper uses firm-level data 
on employment at sanctioned firms between 2013 and 2017. I show that the 
sanctioned firm effect on voting is only present for those firms that gain 
additional employees over the sanctions period. The effect for sanctioned firms 
losing employees over the same period is negative, albeit statistically insignificant. 
This may be taken as an indication that an identity- or nationalism-based 
explanation for Putin’s support is subordinate to a rational economic explanation. 
When sanctions affect one’s livelihood and economic prosperity, Russians may 
be less eager to see the blame in foreign interference and to rally-around-the-flag. 
My paper contributes to the literature on the domestic political impact of 
sanctions. One strand of this literature has found that sanctions lead to popular 
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mobilization against the regime in the target country and policy reversal or step-
down of the regime (Kirshner, 1997; Mack and Khan, 2000; Bolks and Al-
Sowayel, 2000; Marinov, 2005). These findings have been questioned by 
contributions that demonstrate that the impact of sanctions, especially on 
autocratic regimes, is probably weak (Galtung, 1967; Lektzian and Souva, 2007, 
Allen, 2008; Escriba-Folch and Wright, 2010). Nondemocratic regimes are able 
to mitigate the domestic political costs of sanctions by increasing government 
spending or taking repressive measures. These empirical studies typically use a 
cross-country or a case-study approach and are plagued by endogeneity 
problems, particularly in isolating the effect of sanctions on domestic politics 
from other concurrent dynamics or factors. I improve on these existing 
contributions by providing causal identification of the impact of sanctions on the 
target country’s electoral outcomes.  
My paper is also related to the small but growing literature on targeted sanctions. 
Dreger et al. (2015) and Tuzova and Qayub (2016) use VAR models in an attempt 
to estimate the impact of Western sanctions on the Russian economy. Moret et 
al. (2016) and Ahn and Ludema (2016) examine the change in trade flows 
between Russia and the rest of the world following sanction imposition. Whereas 
these studies give a fundamental macroeconomic perspective on how sanctions 
may play out across the economies involved in sanctions, they may be less well-
suited to measure the impact of targeted sanctions, which are mostly affecting 
only specific entities or at most specific sectors of an economy. In this regard, 
Crozet and Hinz (2016), Haidar (2017), Ahn and Ludema (2017) and Draca et. 
al. (2017) take up a micro-level approach in determining the impact of sanctions 
on trade flows or economic performance of the sanctioned firms or sectors. 
Some of the findings support that smart sanctions have been able to negatively 
impact the performance of the entities connected to the business and political 
elites in Russia and Iran (Ahn and Ludema 2017; Draca et. al., 2017). Yet, Crozet 
and Hinz (2016) and Haidar (2017) use customs data to demonstrate that recent 
targeted sanctions have also had unintended consequences of deflecting trade 
flows, particularly in the cases of Russia and Iran. I build upon this micro-data-
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based research agenda on exploration of the impact of sanctions in the following 
ways. First, I compile firm-level data on sanctioned firms and polling-station-
level data across presidential elections in order to explore the precise working-
out of Western sanctions in Russia. Second, I complement the existing 
contributions, which focus on real economic performance of the sanctioned 
entities, whereas my paper draws implications for the sanction effectiveness in 
terms of their political consequences. This is important because, ultimately, 
whether sanctions work comes down to whether or not the targeted regime 
changes its behavior. In this regard, the economic losses endured by the target 
may prove a mixed blessing – it is both possible that the regime is split or that its 
support is reinforced (Kaempfer et. al., 2004).  
Finally, my findings may provide more insight in non-Western-centric concepts 
of statehood and legitimacy. If sanctions do not fracture the target government 
but instead increase its popular support, then it is questionable that even modern-
day targeted sanctions may be able to divide the masses from the elite who is to 
be punished and achieve their intended goal (Freedman, 1998).     
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a brief 
background on Western sanctions imposition against Russia starting 2014. In 
section 3 I describe the data whereas section 4 presents the empirical 
specification, the results and robustness checks. Section 5 expands the analysis 
to heterogeneity effects and potential mechanisms. Section 6 concludes.   
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2. Sanctions background 
In 2013 Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich refused to sign an Association 
Agreement with the EU, which aimed at integrating Ukraine more closely with 
the EU. The President supported a pro-Russian orientation. His position 
instigated mass protests in Ukraine and the formation of an anti-Russian and pro-
European movement. An Ukrainian government-led intervention against the 
protesters led to several deadly incidents. The conflict culminated with President 
Yanukovich fleeing the country and Russia invading the Crimean peninsula in 
March 2014. A referendum held at Crimea shortly thereafter affirmed the 
peninsula’s decision to join the Russian Federation. As these proceedings were 
not abiding by international law, the EU and the US imposed sanctions on 
Russian politicians and against specific economic entities in Crimea. These 
actions were accompanied by pro-Russian and pro-Ukranian protests across 
Ukraine and a rising polarization of the country. The conflict continued escalating 
in the eastern parts of Ukraine – Donetsk and Lugansk – and Russia was accused 
of supporting pro-Russian militant activists in those regions. This led to further 
sanctions adoption by the US and the EU against Russia. Russia answered with 
countersanctions against the sanctioning countries.       
Sanction specifics – The US issued four Executive Orders1 between March and 
December 2014, which authorize US government institutions to impose and 
regulate sanctions against Russia. US sanctions consist of two non-exclusive 
categories. The first category, SSI (Sectoral Sanctions Identification) sanctions, 
are sanctions aimed at entities in the Russian financial, energy and defense 
sectors. The following restrictions apply for these entities: US citizens are 
prohibited from transacting or issuing debt of a maturity of more than 30 days 
or acquiring new assets of the sanctioned entities. Additionally, the transaction 
of certain technologies and services related to deep-water, offshore or shale oil 
activity is also prohibited. The second sanctions category, SDN (Specially 
                                                          
1 Execute Order 13660 (March 6, 2014), Execute Order 13661 (March 16, 2014), Execute 
Order 13662 (March 20, 2014), and Execute Order 13685 (December 19, 2014). 
20                     Did sanctions help Putin? 
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons) sanctions, deals with individuals and 
entities which are to be fully blocked from any economic activity with the US. 
The EU sanctions policy is quite similar to the US one and is set out in several 
EU Council Regulations.2 The EU also maintains two broad sanction categories. 
The first one, Sectoral Sanctions List, prohibits EU citizens to transact in debt or 
equity of a maturity exceeding 30 days with entities on the list. It also bans EU 
exports of deep-water, offshore or shale oil related technologies and services. 
The other category, Restricted Measures List, prohibit the issuance of visas and 
freezes the assets for all individuals featured on the list as well as prohibits any 
economic activities with entities and individuals on the list.  
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
3.1 Data and construction of the dataset 
3.1.1 Elections data 
Elections data comes from the Central Election Commission of the Russian 
Federation and was webscraped from the website of the Commission3, where it 
is made available at the polling station level. Address data of the polling stations 
for the 2018 presidential elections was also available from the Election 
Commission. Polling stations are formed for a period of five years. While most 
of them retain their identification number and localization across elections, some 
do not. In order to account for potential changes in polling stations between the 
2012 and 2018 elections, I use data on the addresses of the polling stations in 
2012 collected by GIS-Lab Russia. This non-governmental organization is a 
society of specialists in geographic information systems, which runs specific 
geographic and remote sensing projects and makes their data available online.4  I 
then geocode the polling station addresses for the 2012 and 2018 presidential 
elections using Yandex Maps and Google Maps APIs. To match polling stations 
                                                          
2 EU Council Regulations 269/2014, 284/2014, 433/2014, 833/2014 and 960/2014. 
3 www.cikrf.ru 
4 gis-lab.info  
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across elections, I use Stata’s geodist routine (Picard, 2010), which calculates 
straight-line distance between two geographical coordinates. Roughly 5,000 
polling stations from the 2018 elections remain unmatched (out of 90,000). 
Additionally, of those matched, 3,671 of the polling stations matched feature a 
matching distance of more than 10 km. I drop these as unlikely or erroneous 
matches. I am then left with 79,922 matched polling stations, with an average 
(median) matched distance between 2012 and 2018 polling stations equal to 0.8 
km (0.3 km) and the 95th percentile corresponding to 3.6 km distance between 
matched polling stations. The election data, consisting of votes for the different 
candidates, number of eligible voters registered and the total ballots cast is kept 
at the polling station level. 
 
3.1.2 Sanctions data 
I identify 361 distinct firms located in Russia from the US and EU sanctions lists. 
Firms are listed with their addresses which I cross-check with firm-level data 
provided by Bureau van Dijk’s AMADEUS database. This database provider 
collects and standardizes financial and ownership data on firms located in 
Europe. The firms’ locations are geocoded using Yandex Maps and Google Maps 
API so that I can match them to polling stations across Russia. The firms are 
located all across Russia (Figure 1), however with a high prevalence in Moscow 
and St. Petersburg – 218 firms are located there, i.e. 60% of all sanctioned firms. 
Overall, sanctioned firms are located in cities of sizable population – another 29 
sanctioned firms are located in cities with population of at least 1,000,000; 69 
firms are located in mid-sized cities of population between 100,000 and 1,000,000 
and the remaining 45 sanctioned firms operate from locations with population 
under 100,000 (Table 2.1).  
  
22                     Did sanctions help Putin? 
    
FI
G
U
RE
 2
.1
: S
PA
TI
A
L 
D
IS
TR
IB
U
TI
O
N
 O
F 
SA
N
CT
IO
N
E
D
 F
IR
M
S 
N
ote
: T
hi
s m
ap
 sh
ow
s t
he
 d
ist
rib
ut
io
n 
of
 sa
nc
tio
ne
d 
fir
m
s a
cr
os
s R
us
sia
. T
he
 si
ze
 o
f t
he
 m
ar
ke
r i
s n
ot
 p
ro
po
rti
on
at
e 
to
 th
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f 
fir
m
s a
t a
 g
iv
en
 lo
ca
tio
n.
 
Did sanctions help Putin?  23 
 
TABLE 2.1: POPULATION SIZE BY SANCTIONED FIRM LOCALITY 
Population at sanctioned firm location Frequency % Cum. % 
Population > 2,000,000 218 60.39 60.39 
1,000,000 < Population <= 2,000,000 29 8.03 68.42 
100,000 < Population <= 1,000,000 69 19.11 87.53 
Population < 100,000 45 12.47 100.00 
Total 361 100.00  
 
Most of the sanctioned firms are small to mid-sized firms, with three-quarters of 
the firms with less than 1,000 employees in 2013 (Table 2.2).  
 
TABLE 2.2: SIZE OF SANCTIONED FIRMS 
Number of employees at 
sanctioned firm in 2013 
Frequency % Cum % 
Employees < 50 53 26.11 26.11 
50 < Employees <= 1,000 102 50.25 76.35 
1,000 < Employees <= 10,000 46 22.66 99.01 
Employees > 10,000 2 0.99 100.00 
Total 203 100.00  
 
The distribution of sanctioned firm size across the largest (Moscow and St. 
Petersburg) and the smallest cities is similar, with a prevalence of small and mid-
sized sanctioned companies, whereas most of the largest sanctioned firms are 
located in cities of population between 100,000 and 2,000,000 (Table 2.3). 
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TABLE 2.3: SANCTIONED FIRM SIZE AND FIRM LOCATION 
POPULATION 
      
 Employees  
< 50 
50 <  
Employees  
<= 1,000 
1,000 <  
Employees 
 <= 10,000 
Employees  
> 10,000 
Total 
Population > 2,000,000 30.83 54.14 15.04 0.00 100.00 
      
1,000,000 < Population 
<= 2,000,000 
6.25 37.50 50.00 6.25 100.00 
100,000 < Population 
<= 1,000,000 
13.79 31.03 51.72 3.45 100.00 
Population < 100,000 28.00 60.00 12.00 0.00 100.00 
Total 26.11 50.25 22.66 0.99 100.00 
 
To assess the effect of a sanctioned firm on local voters’ support for Putin, I 
would ideally interview local voters on their political attitudes, prior and after the 
sanctioning of local firms. Unfortunately, this kind of information at such level 
of geographic detail is not available. I therefore use spatial vicinity of a local 
constituency to a sanctioned firm as a proxy for exposure. From the data 
described above, I construct several treatment variables. The main one identifies 
all polling stations which have one (or more) sanctioned firm within a radius of 
10 km. There are 11,068 polling stations that were treated with at least one nearby 
sanctioned firm. In robustness checks I vary this distance to include only very 
close (within 3 km) or also more faraway-located (within 60 km) sanctioned firms. 
In addition, I construct a treatment variable which accounts for the potential 
economic intensity of treatment. In particular, I draw a radius of 10 km around 
each polling station and sum the number of employees at sanctioned firms within 
this distance. I then relate this number to the total population in the subregion in 
which the particular polling station is located. I thus have a measure giving me 
the ratio of local population employed at sanctioned firms. 
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3.1.3 Control variables 
The polling stations are organized in electoral districts, which match Russian 
subregions. The subregion is the lowest administrative level at which data is 
collected by Rosstat, the Russian Federal State Statistics Service. I collect 
demographic data from Rosstat’s website5 for all 2,351 subregions, which in most 
cases is available for the period 2009-2017. The variables that provide enough 
coverage are total population, as well as population shares according to age, 
gender, social benefits recipients and urbanization. To account for potential 
economic confounders that may influence both the location of a sanctioned firm 
and political support for Putin, I also collect several economic performance 
controls. These include goods and services produced, state investment in fixed 
assets, and average wage, all at the subregional level, provided by Rosstat.  
 
3.2 Summary statistics 
Table 2.4 presents summary statistics of the election, demographic and economic 
data. I compare polling stations that featured a sanctioned firm within 10 km 
distance (column(2)) to polling stations that did not (column (1)).  Those polling 
stations with a sanctioned firm are located in economically stronger subregions: 
average wages are higher, as is state investment per capita and the value of goods 
and services produced. The subregions in which the sanctioned polling stations 
are located are more than six times larger and almost exclusively urban (96.18% 
urban population). 
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TABLE 2.4: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 No sanctioned 
firm within 10km 
Sanctioned firm 
within 10km 
Total 
Election variables (polling station level) 
Putin's vote share (%) in 2012 67.42 55.49 65.17 
 (11.78) (9.55) (12.31) 
    
Putin's vote share (%) in 2018 77.82 73.68 77.04 
 (8.84) (5.42) (8.46) 
    
Turnout (%) in 2012 69.18 62.19 67.86 
 (13.42) (9.16) (13.02) 
    
Turnout (%) in 2018 72.34 63.27 70.63 
 (14.21) (9.30) (13.88) 
    
Demographic variables in 2017 (subregion level) 
Population, 2017 97,788 623,332 196,774 
 (187,189) (484,454) (338,918) 
    
Male (%), 2017 47.49 45.20 47.06 
 (2.03) (1.08) (2.09) 
    
Elderly (%), 2017 26.38 24.16 25.96 
 (4.45) (2.61) (4.26) 
    
Social benefit recipients (%), 2017 25.91 22.99 25.36 
 (9.30) (5.67) (8.81) 
    
Rural population (%), 2017 53.65 3.82 44.27 
 (38.31) (15.61) (40.21) 
    
Economic variables in 2017 (subregion level) 
Average wage (in RUB), 2017 26,825 48,470 30,901 
 (9,362) (18,949) (14,505) 
    
State investment in fixed assets (RUB 
per capita), 2017 
1,105.08 
(3,433.80) 
24,157.39 
(135,826.18) 
5,446.98 
(59,710.75) 
 
    
Goods and services produced (in logs), 
2017 
22.35 
(2.13) 
25.46 
(1.70) 
22.93 
(2.39) 
 
    
Demographic variables, change from 2011 to 2017 (subregion level) 
Population, change, 2017-2011 806 29,530 6,216 
 (9,458) (34,369) (20,523) 
    
Male, % points change, 2017-2011 0.54 0.04 0.44 
 (0.99) (0.70) (0.96) 
    
Elderly, % points change, 2017-2011 2.69 1.17 2.41 
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 (1.18) (1.28) (1.34) 
    
Social benefit recipients, % points 
change, 2017-2011 
-1.68 
(7.94) 
-1.39 
(4.47) 
-1.62 
(7.41) 
 
    
Rural population, % points change, 
2017-2011 
-0.04 
(4.65) 
-0.13 
(0.66) 
-0.06 
(4.20) 
 
    
Economic variables, change from 2011 to 2017 (subregion level) 
Average wage (in RUB), change, 2017-
2011 
4,895 
(2,573) 
8,765 
(6,910) 
5,624 
(4,081) 
 
    
State investment in fixed assets (RUB 
per capita), change, 2017-2011 
-83.66 
(4,171.94) 
9,379.55 
(67,604.71) 
1,698.74 
(29,809.18) 
 
    
Goods and services produced (in logs), 
change, 2017-2011 
0.19 
(0.43) 
0.27 
(0.54) 
0.21 
(0.45) 
 
Observations (number of polling 
stations) 
47,695 11,068 58,763 
 
The polling stations that have a nearby sanctioned firm increased their support 
for Putin by 18.19 percentage points (from 55.49% to 73.68%). At those polling 
stations where there are no neighboring sanctioned firms, Putin’s vote share rose 
by 10.40 percentage points (from 67.42% to 77.82%). These numbers are already 
suggestive of the vote-increasing effect a sanctioned firm may have had on local 
constituencies in the presidential elections in 2018. Yet, this implication does not 
consider the difference in the number of eligible voters by polling station, nor 
does it account for the differing voting trends across demographic and economic 
characteristics. In my subsequent estimation I account for all these factors. 
The sample consists of 58,863 polling stations, out of approximately 90,000. 
These polling stations are spread across 1709 Russian subregions, out of a total 
of 2351 subregions. 
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. The subset “No sanctioned firm within 10km” is 
formed by the polling stations which have at least one sanctioned firm within a 10 km distance. 
The subset “Sanctioned firm within 10km” consists of those polling stations which do not have 
any sanctioned firms within a 10 km distance. Observations are unweighted. 
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4. Empirical specification and results 
I estimate the effect of having a sanctioned firm in close vicinity on voting 
behavior using a difference-in-difference approach. The treatment received by 
voters at a given polling station is the availability of a sanctioned firm within 10 
km distance from the polling station. Measuring the effect of sanctioned firms 
involves comparing the changes in voting behavior of the electorate at polling 
stations where a firm is sanctioned after 2014 relative to the differences in voting 
behavior at those polling stations where no firm is sanctioned after 2014. 
The difference-in-difference approach guards against certain threats to 
identification of the treatment effect. Looking at the differences in vote share 
across time assures that time-invariant characteristics of the polling station or the 
voters cannot be the reason for the change in voting behavior. Moreover, any 
time-varying effects are also controlled for by comparing the change in vote share 
between treated and untreated polling stations. Hence, the comparison of the 
change in the treatment group relative to the control group allows me to distill 
the effect of the treatment. In order to be able to attribute the difference in 
changes between the two groups as the effect of sanctioned firms, the treatment 
has to be unconditionally or conditionally (based on controls) exogenous. 
Specifically, the US and the EU should not have sanctioned firms that are close 
to polling stations where voters are more likely to increase their support for Putin, 
even if there are no sanctioned firms nearby. Since the assignment of polling 
stations in treated and unterated has not been made randomly, I explore the 
determinants of selection and pinpoint the variables predicting the occurrence of 
a sanctioned firm in 2018. 
The firms that have been sanctioned by the US and EU starting 2014 may be 
located in areas that feature strong support for Putin. Indeed, the proclaimed aim 
of the US and the EU has been to use sanctions to hurt Russian political and 
business elites, who support the Russian annexation of Crimea and the Russian 
regime. If the sanctioned firms are situated next to polling stations that were 
Did sanctions help Putin?  29 
becoming more pro-Putin between 2012 and 2018, then the estimated effect of 
sanctioned firms in vicinity would be probably capturing that political trend. 
The treatment variable, 𝑇𝑇10𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,2018 is a dummy variables, measured at the polling 
stations level and equal to one if there is at least one sanctioned firm within 10 
km of the polling station; and equal to zero otherwise. To examine the 
determinants of the assignment to treatment, I estimate the following linear 
probability model: 
 
𝑇𝑇10𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,2018 =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,2012𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,2012𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃.𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒. + 𝜝𝜝2017𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖,2017 + 𝜝𝜝2017−2011𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖,2017−2011 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
(2.1) 
Of particular interest are the two political variables at the polling station level – 
Putin’s vote share in 2012, 𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,2012𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃  , and voter turnout, equal to the ratio of 
votes cast to eligible voters at polling station i in subregion j (in percentage), 
𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,2012𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃.𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒.. Further determinants of the treatment are demographic and 
economic variables measured at the subregion level. These are the set of controls 
for 2017 - 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖,2017 and the set of changes in controls between 2011 and 2017, 
𝑿𝑿2017−2011. To account for the different number of eligible voters across polling 
stations I weigh the observations by number of eligible voters at a polling station 
in 2012.6 I cluster the standard errors at the subregion level. 
 
The results of this estimation are presented in Table 2.5. In column (1), I first 
estimate the linear probability model without controls and fixed effects. The 
presence of a sanctioned firm is positively and statistically significantly related to 
turnout and negatively and statistically significantly related to Putin’s vote share 
in 2012. Adding demographic characteristics to the estimation (column (2)) 
                                                          
6 The results remain qualitatively similar when I weigh the observations by the number of 
eligible voters in 2018 or by the number of total votes cast at a polling station in 2012 or 2018. 
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reduces the magnitude of those relationships as does the addition of economic 
controls (column (3)). Next, I include subregion fixed effects (column (4)). This 
specification accounts for the determinants of within-subregion location of 
sanctioned firms, controlling at the same time for demographic and economic 
characteristics. Although the coefficients on the political variables are still 
statistically significant, the addition of the geographic fixed effects further lowers 
both political variables coefficients to magnitudes which are close to zero. 
Moreover, polling stations with higher pro-Putin vote share are less likely to 
feature a nearby sanctioned firm – the estimated coefficient is -.001. Running an 
F-test for statistical significance of all demographic or all economic controls 
shows that I cannot reject the hypothesis that these control variables are zero (F-
test = 0.95 / 0.94). The presence of a sanctioned firm is therefore uncorrelated 
with demographic and economic variables once geographic heterogeneity is 
accounted for and negatively related to voters’ support for Putin. While 
sanctioned firms tend to be present in more urban and economically vibrant areas 
(see Table 2.1), the assignment to polling stations within a subregion is plausibly 
random. In the last column (5) I examine the impact of voting trends prior 
treatment on the predictability of sanctioned firm occurrence. The vote share 
change for United Russia7 between the two presidential elections in 2008 and 
2012 is not statistically significant. 
 
                                                          
7 Dmitry Medvedev and not Vladimir Putin was the party’s candidate in 2008 
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4.1 Main result 
I compare polling stations featuring at least one sanctioned firm within 10 km 
distance (𝑇𝑇10𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,2018=1) to polling stations with no sanctioned firms within 10 
km distance (𝑇𝑇10𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,2018=0). I am interested in examining the impact of 
sanctioning a nearby firm on the change in Putin’s vote share at the polling station 
level between 2012 and 2018. Sanctions were adopted starting 2014. My 
specification is as follows: 
 
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,2018𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 −  𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,2012𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃  =  𝛼𝛼 +  𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇10𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,2018 + 𝜝𝜝2017𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖,2017 + 𝜝𝜝2017−2011𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖,2017−2011 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
(2.2) 
Similar to the specification examining the determinants of sanctioned firm 
availability, I again control for subregion-level demographic and economic 
characteristics in levels (𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖,2017) and in changes (𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖,2017−2011). I weight the 
observations by the number of eligible voters at the polling station level in 2012 
and cluster the standard errors at the subregion level. 
Table 2.6 exhibits the estimation results. Absent of controls or fixed effects, the 
difference-in-difference estimation shows that on average, the overall support for 
Putin in my sample increased by over 12% (𝛼𝛼� = 12.006). Relative to this overall 
shift, polling stations with a nearby sanctioned firm increased their vote share for 
Putin by 6.72% relative to polling stations without a nearby sanctioned firm, a 
statistically significant result. Including demographic controls in column (2) 
almost halves the magnitude of the estimate of the sanctioned firm presence to 
3.99%, but it remains statistically significant. In column (3), I add economic 
controls which further lowers the magnitude of the sanctioned firm effect, 
leaving it statistically significant. Finally, in the benchmark specification in 
column (4), I include subregion fixed effects, in addition to all control variables. 
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This specification accounts for unobservable trends in voting behavior common 
to a subregion that may be correlated with the presence of a sanctioned firm. The 
effect of a sanctioned firm on voting is identified by comparing neighboring 
polling stations with and without sanctioned firms, within the same subregion. 
The estimated effect is more precise than in the other specifications (columns 
(1)-(3)) and is positive, statistically significant and sizable, at 1.54%. 
 
Table 2.6: THE EFFECT OF SANCTIONED FIRMS ON 2012-2018 
PUTIN'S VOTE SHARE CHANGE 
Dependent variable: Putin’s vote share change between 2018 and 2012 presidential elections 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sanctioned firm within 
10 km 
6.717*** 
(0.428) 
3.993*** 
(0.549) 
1.499** 
(0.587) 
1.543*** 
(0.383) 
 
Constant 12.006*** 54.683*** 36.744*** -9.820 
 (0.264) (7.003) (8.086) (53.048) 
Demographic controls no yes yes yes 
Economic controls no no yes yes 
Subregion FE no no no yes 
R-squared 0.107 0.197 0.225 0.568 
N 58763 58763 58763 58763 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The unit of observation is polling station. The dependent variable is (Putin’s vote share 
for the 2018 presidential election) - (Putin’s vote share for the 2012 presidential election). The 
variable “Sanctioned firm within 10 km” is a binary variable that equals one if there is a 
sanctioned firm within 10 km distance from the polling station. The demographic controls are 
population, shares of males, elderly and social benefits recipients in the total population and 
rural population share, all measured at the subregion level and made available by Rosstat, present 
both in the 2017 values and in differences between 2017 and 2011. The economic controls are 
average wage, state investment in fixed assets per capita and goods and services produced, all 
measured at the subregion level and provided by Rosstat, used in the estimation both in 2017 
values and in differences between 2017 and 2011. Robust standard errors are clustered by 
subregion. The observations are weighted by the number of eligible voters at the polling station 
level in the 2012 presidential election. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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4.2 Robustness 
In the following, I test the robustness of the above results to alternative 
definitions of the treatment variable as well as to placebo treatments. 
Up to now, the definition of the treatment variable - exposure to a sanctioned 
firm – was fixed to a radius of ten kilometers around the polling station. This 
choice has been guided by the average commuting distance from one’s home to 
work. Yet, my sample features firms in very heterogeneous settings – from the 
multimillion inhabitant cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg to rural settlements 
in the Northeast of Russia. The median distance travelled to work in the Moscow 
region was 30 kilometers (with an average of 50 km, Shitov & Shitova, 2017) and 
this distance declines with smaller localities (SuperJob, 2015) to around 6 km in 
rural settlements (Yandex, 2016).  
In order to check if my results hold against different specifications of the 
exposure, I now vary the definition of treatment down to 3 km and up to 60 km 
distance from a polling station. The results are presented in Table 2.7, columns 
(1) and (2). The positive effect of vicinity to a sanctioned firm on Putin’s vote 
share remains about the same for a distance of 60 km (𝛽𝛽1� = 1.586) while it 
decreases for the smaller distance of 3 km (𝛽𝛽1� = 0.467). One explanation for 
the strong effect at even higher distances follows from the structure of the sample 
of sanctioned firms. About 60 % of the firms that have been sanctioned in 2014 
are located in Moscow or St. Petersburg. These are cities that attract commuters 
from afar while also featuring denser presence of sanctioned firms than any other 
locations in the sample. The effect of the existence of a sanctioned firm might 
have thus spilled over to more distant neighboring areas. Finally, it is reassuring 
to see that the main result remains valid and statistically significant with the very 
tight definition of exposure to treatment of 3 km (column (2)). 
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TABLE 2.7: ROBUSTNESS 
Dependent variable: Putin’s vote chare change between 2018 and 2012 presidential 
elections 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sanctioned firm within 60 
km 
1.586*** 
(0.520) 
   
    
     
Sanctioned firm within 3 
km 
 0.467* 
(0.284) 
  
    
     
Share of subregion 
population (%), working at 
sanctioned firm(s) within 10 
km in 2012 
  0.080* 
(0.047) 
 
    
     
Sanctioned firm within 10 
km 
   1.640*** 
(0.380) 
    
Demographic controls yes yes yes yes 
Economic controls yes yes yes yes 
Subregion FE yes yes yes yes 
Unweighted no no no yes 
R-squared 0.568 0.567 0.567 0.509 
N 58763 58763 58763 58763 
Second, I also consider the number of workers employed at all sanctioned firms 
within 10 km of a given polling station, relative to the total population at the 
Notes: The unit of observation is polling station. The dependent variable is (Putin’s vote 
share for the 2018 presidential election) - (Putin’s vote share for the 2012 presidential 
election). The variables “Sanctioned firm within 60 km” and “Sanctioned firm within 3 km” 
are binary variables that equal one if a sanctioned firm is within 60 km or 3 km distance 
from a polling station, respectively. The variable “Share of subregion population (%), 
working at sanctioned firm(s) within 10 km in 2012” measures the percentage share of the 
population of the subregion, to which the polling station belongs to, that works at 
sanctioned firms located in 10 km vicinity of the specific polling station in 2012. Data on 
employment at sanctioned firms was put together from Bureau van Dijk’s AMADEUS 
database. The demographic controls are population, shares of males, elderly and social 
benefits recipients in the total population and rural population share, all measured at the 
subregion level and made available by Rosstat, present both in the 2017 values and in 
differences between 2017 and 2011. The economic controls are average wage, state 
investment in fixed assets per capita and goods and services produced, all measured at the 
subregion level and provided by Rosstat, used in the estimation both in 2017 values and in 
differences between 2017 and 2011. Robust standard errors are clustered by subregion. The 
observations are weighted by the number of eligible voters at the polling station level in the 
2012 presidential election. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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subregion level. Because the sanctioned firms vary in size, the number of 
employees directly affected by a sanction also varies substantially (mean 
employment at a sanctioned firm in 2012 = 159; median = 939). This variation 
in direct exposure suggests variation in treatment effects. Larger firms may imply 
stronger effects because they reach a wider part of the constituency through their 
employees and their families. Larger firms may also attract more public attention 
and media coverage, through which the awareness about the sanctioning of a 
specific firm may have been carried to a wider audience. The results from a 
specification with the percentage of subregion population employed at a 
sanctioned firm is shown in column (3) of Table 2.4. The effect of the treatment 
is positive, albeit less precisely estimated than the effect from my benchmark 
regression, which uses a simple dummy. 
Finally, in column (4) I show that differences in the number of eligible voters 
across polling stations are not driving the results. The estimated effect of the 
occurrence of a sanctioned firm within 10 km of a polling station on Putin’s vote 
share remains about the same (𝛽𝛽1� = 1.640) when running an unweighted 
regression. 
Next, I explore the possibility that unobservable confounding variables are 
determining both the location of sanctioned firms and the voting behavior of the 
electorate. Specifically, I design a placebo test and test whether the availability of 
a sanctioned firm within 10 km of a polling station in 2018 predicts changes in 
voting behavior between 2008 and 2012. There should be no effect as there were 
no sanctioned firms in Russia prior to 2014. Table 2.8 reveals that while the 
occurrence of a sanctioned firm in 2018 has a predictive power for voting 
behavior change between the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections, the effect is 
negative. This implies that there might be some unobservable features that are 
related both to the location of a sanctioned firm and the tendency of voters to 
support Putin; however, these omitted characteristics seem to be working against 
finding a positive effect between 2012 and 2018, as the sign of the estimated 
relationship is negative (𝛽𝛽1� = −1.579).  
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TABLE 2.8: PLACEBO REGRESSION 
Dependent variable: United Russia’s vote share change between 2012 and 2008 presidential 
elections 
 
Sanctioned firm within 10 km 
 
-1.579*** 
 (0.510) 
 
Demographic controls yes 
Economic controls yes 
Subregion FE yes 
R-squared 0.538 
N 58762 
The negative effect can also be explained by the unavailability of address 
information on the location of the 2008 polling stations. While many of the 
polling stations’ locations and numbering are kept across elections, some polling 
stations do change their location, some are closed down and others are opened 
at new places. Thus, the 2008 polling stations have been matched to the rest of 
the elections data only based on their subregion information and polling station 
number. This method is prone to errors and may account for the negative effect 
that I find. To address this challenge, I aggregate the data to the next 
administrative level – subregion – and redo the placebo analysis. The results in 
Table A2.1 demonstrate that the presence of a sanctioned firm within the 
boundaries of a subregion in 2018 does not influence voting behavior between 
2008 and 2012.  
 
Notes: The unit of observation is polling station. The dependent variable is (United Russia’s vote 
share for the 2012 presidential election) - (United Russia’s vote share for the 2008 presidential 
election). The variable “Sanctioned firm within 10 km” is a binary variable that equals one if a 
sanctioned firm is within 10 km distance from the polling station. The demographic controls 
are population, shares of males, elderly and social benefits recipients in the total population and 
rural population share, all measured at the subregion level and made available by Rosstat, present 
both in the 2017 values and in differences between 2017 and 2011. The economic controls are 
average wage, state investment in fixed assets per capita and goods and services produced, all 
measured at the subregion level and provided by Rosstat, used in the estimation both in 2017 
values and in differences between 2017 and 2011. Robust standard errors are clustered by 
subregion. The observations are weighted by the number of eligible voters at the polling station 
level in the 2012 presidential election. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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4.3 Magnitude of the effect 
My benchmark specification indicates that the presence of a sanctioned firm 
within 10 km distance of a polling station had a significant impact on Putin’s vote 
share in the 2018 presidential elections. The benchmark estimate from Table 2.5, 
column (4) implies a confidence interval of (0.790; 2.294).  In what follows, I 
offer an interpretation of the magnitude of the estimated effects. 
The average shift in favor of Putin in my sample is equal to 12.006 percentage 
points, with a standard deviation of 9.706. The impact of a sanctioned firm is 
equal to about one-sixth of the standard deviation, a reasonably sizable effect.  
Additionally, I estimate the likely number of voters that shifted their votes to 
support Putin. By 2018, there were 11,068 polling stations which featured at least 
one sanctioned firm within a 10 km distance. A total of 18,615,116 votes were 
cast at those particular polling stations. Abstracting from voter turnout changes, 
these numbers imply that 0.01543*18,615,116 ≈ 287,231 voters shifted their 
votes from other candidates to Putin. 
 
5. Heterogeneous effects and potential mechanisms 
I have established that the presence of a sanctioned firm close to a polling station 
increases the electoral support for Putin. In this section, I analyze the potential 
mechanisms driving this effect. I start with an exploration of the heterogeneous 
effects of the treatment depending on support for Putin in the 2018 elections and 
across different geographic areas. I then look at the impact of sanctioned firms 
on mobilization of voters. Lastly, I exploit the rich firm-level information on the 
sanctioned firms to examine the most likely case for the treatment effect. 
 
5.1 Heterogeneous effects 
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I examine how the sanctioned firm effect interacts with the political positions of 
local constituencies. In order to do so, I split the polling stations into thirds, 
depending on their support for Putin in the 2018 presidential elections. I then 
interact the treatment dummy for sanctioned firm within 10 km with the bottom 
and the top third of pro-Putin-voting polling stations. Table 2.9 reports the 
results from this estimation. Both interaction terms are positive and statistically 
significant - the impact of a sanctioned firm is higher not only in those 
communities that are most supportive of Putin but also across those polling 
stations where Putin enjoys the least support. These results imply that the 
imposition of a sanction on a local firm not only increases the support for the 
regime among supporters but also convinces previous opponents to vote pro-
Putin. 
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Table 2.9: INTERACTIONS 
Dependent variable: Putin’s vote share change between 2018 and 2012 presidential elections 
  
Sanctioned firm within 10km 1.072*** 
 (0.374) 
  
Most supportive of Putin polling station 4.659*** 
 (0.217) 
  
Sanctioned firm within 10km # Most supportive of Putin 
polling station 
1.173** 
(0.497) 
 
Least supportive of Putin polling station -3.622*** 
 (0.161) 
  
Sanctioned firm within 10km # Least supportive of Putin 
polling station 
1.173*** 
(0.277) 
 
Demographic controls yes 
Economic controls yes 
Subregion FE yes 
R-squared 0.614 
N 58763 
Next, I test how locality characteristics influence the effect of a sanctioned firm 
on voting behavior. Most of the sanctioned firms are situated in Moscow and St. 
Petersburg (60% of all sanctioned firms) and these two cities are quite distinct in 
terms of political trends from the rest of Russia. For example, the two megacities 
show the highest levels of support for oppositional parties (Dmitriev and 
Notes: The unit of observation is polling station. The dependent variable is (Putin’s vote share 
for the 2018 presidential election) - (Putin’s vote share for the 2012 presidential election). The 
variable “Sanctioned firm within 10 km” is a binary variable that equals one if a sanctioned firm 
is within 10 km distance from the polling station. The dummy variables “Most supportive of 
Putin polling station” and “Least supportive of Putin polling station” are constructed by 
dividing the 58763 polling station observations into thirds based on Putin’s vote share in the 
2018 presidential elections. The variable “Most supportive of Putin polling station” indicates a 
polling station in the top third. The variable “Least supportive of Putin polling station” indicates 
a polling station in the bottom third. The omitted category indicates the middle third. 
 The demographic controls are population, shares of males, elderly and social benefits recipients 
in the total population and rural population share, all measured at the subregion level and made 
available by Rosstat, present both in the 2017 values and in differences between 2017 and 2011. 
The economic controls are average wage, state investment in fixed assets per capita and goods 
and services produced, all measured at the subregion level and provided by Rosstat, used in the 
estimation both in 2017 values and in differences between 2017 and 2011. Robust standard 
errors are clustered by subregion. The observations are weighted by the number of eligible 
voters at the polling station level in the 2012 presidential election. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Did sanctions help Putin?  41 
 
 
Treisman, 2012; Lankina and Voznaya, 2015). To check whether there are any 
differences in the impact of the availability of a nearby sanctioned firm on voting 
behavior between Moscow and St. Petersburg and the rest of Russia, I subset the 
sample along these two geographic groups. The results, which are reported in 
Table 2.10, show that the main result of this paper is indeed driven by voting 
behavior shift outside the two largest Russian cities. While the direction, strength 
and significance of the sanctioned firm presence coefficient remains about the 
same for the sample subset without Moscow and St. Petersburg, it becomes 
insignificant when I run the regression on the two cities only. The political divide 
between the urban and progressive Moscow and St. Petersburg is upheld also in 
the ability of a sanction imposition to sway voters’ behavior. 
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Table 2.10: GEOGRAPHICAL HETEROGENEITY 
Dependent variable: Putin’s vote share change between 2018 and 2012 presidential elections 
 No Moscow and St. 
Petersburg 
Moscow and St. 
Petersburg only 
 (1) (2) 
 
Sanctioned firm within 10 km 
 
1.637*** 
 
0.540 
 (0.416) (0.468) 
Demographic controls yes yes 
Economic controls yes yes 
Subregion FE yes yes 
R-squared 0.536 0.306 
N 54537 4226 
 
5.2 Voter mobilization or vote swings? 
Up until now, I have shown that sanctioned firms led to rise in support for Putin. 
However, this observation alone does not explain how Putin’s increased success 
came about. In what follows, I examine whether the approval came from other 
parties’ voters switching to United Russia (the party Putin is affiliated with), or 
from new voters that were attracted to cast their vote following the sanction 
imposition. It is possible that business and political elites who backed the regime 
and who were among the owners or managers of the sanctioned firms tried to 
mobilize local nonvoters to vote in favor of Putin. Indeed, there were several 
Notes: The unit of observation is polling station. The subset “No Moscow and St. Petersburg” is 
formed by the polling stations in all regions but Moscow and St. Petersburg. The subset 
“Moscow and St. Petersburg only” is the complementary subset. The dependent variable is 
(Putin’s vote share for the 2018 presidential election) - (Putin’s vote share for the 2012 
presidential election). The variable “Sanctioned firm within 10 km” is a binary variable that equals 
one if a sanctioned firm is within 10 km distance from the polling station. The demographic 
controls are population, shares of males, elderly and social benefits recipients in the total 
population and rural population share, all measured at the subregion level and made available by 
Rosstat, present both in the 2017 values and in differences between 2017 and 2011. The 
economic controls are average wage, state investment in fixed assets per capita and goods and 
services produced, all measured at the subregion level and provided by Rosstat, used in the 
estimation both in 2017 values and in differences between 2017 and 2011. Robust standard errors 
are clustered by subregion. The observations are weighted by the number of eligible voters at 
the polling station level in the 2012 presidential election. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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reports of “corporate mobilization” attempts across Russian state-owned 
enterprises, which were supposedly charged with the task to get out the votes.8 
To test whether the significant impact of sanctioned firms comes from voter 
mobilization or voter switches, I employ the following voter turnout 
specification: 
 
𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,2018𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃.𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒. −  𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,2012𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃.𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒.  =  𝛼𝛼 +  𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇10𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,2018 + 𝛽𝛽2(𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒. 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,2018𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃.𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒. −  𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒. 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,2012𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃.𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒.) + 𝜝𝜝2017𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖,2017+ 𝜝𝜝2017−2011𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖,2017−2011 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
 (2.3) 
where 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃.𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒. is the percentage total votes at polling station i, in 
subregion j, in year 𝑡𝑡 ∈ {2012, 2018}. I control for the change in the number of 
eligible voters (𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒. 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,2018𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃.𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒. −  𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒. 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,2012𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃.𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒.), as well as for the 
usual economic and demographic characteristics of subregions. 
Comparing polling stations with and without a sanctioned firm within 10 km 
distance suggests that these voter mobilization groups may have been successful 
in attracting new voters. Table 2.11 shows that at polling stations with a 
sanctioned firm, voter turnout increased, but the estimated effect is not 
statistically significant. When I disaggregate the effect of a sanctioned firm 
according to the level of support for Putin at the polling station, I find evidence 
that the turnout effect is quite strong and statistically significant at those polling 
stations that are most in favor of Putin. Combining this finding with the evidence 
                                                          
8 See newspaper reports from Kommersant (На выборах задействуют корпоративный 
ресурс, February, 26, 2017, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3227902 ), Vedomosti 
(Кремль начал мониторинг экономических событий, влияющих на региональные 
настроения, February 27, 2017, 
https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2017/02/27/679036-kreml-monitoring ) and 
Washington Post (Yes, the Kremlin is worried — about Russia's own presidential elections, 
December 6, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2017/12/06/yes-the-kremlin-is-worried-about-russias-own-presidential-
elections/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.baa567e429b2 ) 
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from Table 2.9 implies that sanction imposition urged nonvoters at pro-Putin 
polling stations to vote for Putin. 
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Table 2.11: TURNOUT 
Dependent variable: Voter turnout 
 (1) (2) 
Sanctioned firm within 10 km 1.054  
 (1.032)  
   
Change in eligible voters (%), 2012-2018 0.929*** 0.930*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) 
   
   
Sanctioned firm within 10km  0.705 
  (1.070) 
   
   
Most supportive of Putin polling station  7.703*** 
  (0.487) 
   
   
Sanctioned firm within 10km # Most supportive 
of Putin polling station 
 2.685** 
(1.163) 
  
   
   
Least supportive of Putin polling station  -1.825*** 
  (0.333) 
   
   
Sanctioned firm within 10km # Least supportive 
of Putin polling station 
 0.012 
(0.472) 
  
Demographic controls yes yes 
Economic controls yes yes 
Subregion FE yes yes 
R-squared 0.877 0.880 
N 58763 58763 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3 Potential mechanism 
Notes: The unit of observation is polling station. The dependent variable is the percentage change in 
total votes cast between 2012 and 2018 presidential elections. The variable “Change in eligible voters 
(%), 2012-2018” indicates the percentage change in eligible voters registered at a given polling station 
between 2012 and 2018. The variable “Sanctioned firm within 10 km” is a binary variable that equals 
one if a sanctioned firm is within 10 km distance from the polling station. The dummy variables “Most 
supportive of Putin polling station” and “Least supportive of Putin polling station” are constructed 
by dividing the 58763 polling station observations into thirds based on Putin’s vote share in the 2018 
presidential elections. The variable “Most supportive of Putin polling station” indicates a polling 
station in the top third. The variable “Least supportive of Putin polling station” indicates a polling 
station in the bottom third. The omitted category indicates the middle third. The demographic 
controls are population, shares of males, elderly and social benefits recipients in the total population 
and rural population share, all measured at the subregion level and made available by Rosstat, present 
both in the 2017 values and in differences between 2017 and 2011. The economic controls are average 
wage, state investment in fixed assets per capita and goods and services produced, all measured at the 
subregion level and provided by Rosstat, used in the estimation both in 2017 values and in differences 
between 2017 and 2011. Robust standard errors are clustered by subregion. The observations are 
weighted by the number of eligible voters at polling station level in the 2012 presidential election. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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The literature examining voters’ support for Putin puts forward several 
explanations. One strand of research maintains the economic performance 
hypothesis, i.e., the Russian public assesses the performance of the political elite 
based on objective economic performance measures (Rose, Mishler and Munro, 
2011; Treisman, 2011). Others underline the importance of control over media 
in Russia as well as the active hindrance of political challengers eager to join the 
political system (Enikolopov et. al., 2011, 2016; Robertson, 2017). In exploring 
the attitudinal changes of the electorate under extraordinary conditions one could 
distill the most likely foundations of a regime support. Sanctions imposition 
provide a useful opportunity to test whether in moments of international crisis 
Russians are prone to “rally-around-the-flag”.  
In order to discern between competing explanations for the increased support of 
Putin at polling stations featuring a sanctioned firm, I devise the following test. I 
collect employment data for the sanctioned firms, before and after the imposition 
of sanctions.9 For every polling station, featuring more than one sanctioned firm 
within 10 km distance, I aggregate the number of employees of all the nearby 
sanctioned firms. I then split the treated polling stations in two groups – those 
where in sum, sanctioned firms within 10 km have gained additional employees 
between 2013 and 2017, and those where the sanctioned firms (in sum) have lost 
employees over the same period.  
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,2018𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 −  𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,2012𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃  =  𝛼𝛼 +  𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇10𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,2018𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒.𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑇𝑇10𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,2018𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒.𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 +𝜝𝜝2017𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖,2017+ 𝜝𝜝2017−2011𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖,2017−2011 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
(2.4) 
Equation (2.4) is identical to the baseline specification with exception of the 
treatment variable, which is now split into treated polling stations where 
employment at sanctioned firms rose between 2013 and 2017, 𝑇𝑇10𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,2018𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒.𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃, 
and those polling stations where employment at sanctioned firms declined during 
                                                          
9 Employment data for Russian firms is provided by Bureau van Dijk, AMADEUS database. 
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the same period, 𝑇𝑇10𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,2018𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒.𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃.  By separately estimating the effects of winning 
and losing sanctioned firms, I can check whether the electorate blindly rallies 
around the flag or if it responds rationally to economic forces. Table 2.12 shows 
that only those sanctioned firms that continued to perform well after sanction 
imposition increase the vote share for Putin. The estimated coefficient for the 
sanctioned firms that lost employees between 2013 and 2017 is negative, albeit 
insignificant. 
 
Table 2.12: ECONOMIC EXPLANATION 
Dependent variable: Putin’s vote share change between 2018 and 2012 presidential elections 
 
Employment gain at sanctioned firms, 2017-2013 
 
0.868* 
 (0.485) 
  
Employment loss at sanctioned firms, 2017-2013 -0.203 
 (0.548) 
Demographic controls yes 
Economic controls yes 
Subregion FE yes 
R-squared 0.567 
N 58763 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These outcomes are meaningful in discerning the reasons for the longevity of 
Putin’s leadership in Russia. The results imply that support for the government 
is subject to positive economic performance. Russians do not blindly “rally-
around-the-flag”. Even in hybrid regimes politicians are held accountable for the 
economic performance of the country. Exposure to a sanctioned firm is 
Notes: The unit of observation is polling station. The dependent variable is (Putin’s vote share 
for the 2018 presidential election) - (Putin’s vote share for the 2012 presidential election). The 
variable “Employment gain at sanctioned firms, 2017-2013” measures the log gain in 
employment at sanctioned firms within 10 km distance from the polling station, between 2013 
and 2017. The variable “Employment loss at sanctioned firms, 2017-2013” measures the log 
loss in employment at sanctioned firms within 10 km distance from the polling station, between 
2013 and 2017. The demographic controls are population, shares of males, elderly and social 
benefits recipients in the total population and rural population share, all measured at the 
subregion level and made available by Rosstat, present both in the 2017 values and in differences 
between 2017 and 2011. The economic controls are average wage, state investment in fixed 
assets per capita and goods and services produced, all measured at the subregion level and 
provided by Rosstat, used in the estimation both in 2017 values and in differences between 2017 
and 2011. Robust standard errors are clustered by subregion. The observations are weighted by 
the number of eligible voters at the polling station level in the 2012 presidential election. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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associated with higher levels of support for Putin, but only when those firms 
continue to perform well under the sanctions regime. 
My empirical analysis provides several principal findings. First, I find evidence 
that exposure to a sanctioned firm is associated with increased levels of support 
for Putin. Moreover, I established that there has been a mobilization of nonvoters 
as well as switch of voters from the anti-Putin polling stations voting in favor of 
Putin in the 2018 elections, when there was a nearby sanctioned firm. This 
evidence is supportive of the “rally-around-the-flag” hypothesis, but as this 
section shows, it is an insufficient explanation. Specifically, sanctioned firms’ 
performance measured by the percentage change in total employees between 
2013 and 2017 is a strong and statistically significant predictor of higher support 
for Putin at the treated polling stations. The loyalty and increased support of the 
constituency is not irrational but involves sustained economic performance. I 
interpret these effects as supportive of the economic performance hypothesis 
(Rose, Mishler and Munro, 2011; Treisman, 2011). 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper studies the political consequences of targeted sanction imposition on 
elections in Russia. In particular, I examine the impact of sanction imposition in 
2014 on the change in Putin’s vote share between 2012 and 2018. I find evidence 
that sanction imposition increased Putin’s electoral approval by 1.54 percentage 
points. This shift is sizable compared to the 13.1 percentage point overall shift in 
support for Putin between 2012 and 2018. Heterogeneity results suggest that 
these electoral responses are stronger at those polling stations that show either 
relatively high but or particularly low support for Putin. Combined with the 
impact on turnout, I interpret the effect of sanctioned firms as mobilizing 
nonvoters in pro-Putin localities and persuading voters to switch in favor of Putin 
in anti-Putin areas. 
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Based on firm-level employment data on the sanctioned firms, I deepen the 
analysis by testing a possible explanation for the increased vote share in favor of 
Putin. I explore if voters react to the loss of local jobs induced by sanctions.  I 
find that the upward shift in vote share for Putin is only statistically significant at 
those polling stations for which the nearby sanctioned firms experienced 
employment gains over the sanctions period. The lack of punitive reaction from 
voters in vicinity of sanctioned firms experiencing economic losses may indicate 
the acceptance of the narrative of Western responsibility and “rallying around the 
flag”. 
The findings have implications for understanding the impact of modern-day 
“smart” sanctions that were introduced precisely with the goal to affect only 
specific groups related to the ruling elite and prevent unintended consequences. 
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APPENDIX A2 
 
TABLE A2.1: PLACEBO REGRESSION AT THE SUBREGION LEVEL 
Dependent variable: United Russia’s vote share change between 2012 and 2008 presidential 
elections 
 
Sanctioned firm within subregion 
 
0.688 
 (0.470) 
 
Demographic controls yes 
Economic controls yes 
Region FE yes 
R-squared 0.706 
N 1816 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The unit of observation is the subregion. The dependent variable is (United Russia’s vote 
share for the 2012 presidential election) - (United Russia’s vote share for the 2008 presidential 
election). The variable “Sanctioned firm within subregion” is a binary variable that equals one if 
a sanctioned firm is located within the boundaries of the subregion. The demographic controls 
are population, shares of males, elderly and social benefits recipients in the total population and 
rural population share, all measured at the subregion level and made available by Rosstat, present 
both in the 2017 values and in differences between 2017 and 2011. The economic controls are 
average wage, state investment in fixed assets per capita and goods and services produced, all 
measured at the subregion level and provided by Rosstat, used in the estimation both in 2017 
values and in differences between 2017 and 2011. Robust standard errors are clustered by region. 
The observations are weighted by the number of eligible voters at the subregion level in the 
2012 presidential election. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 Chapter 3: Strategic goods trade bias in human rights sanctions 
 
I study whether there is a strategic goods trade bias in human rights 
sanctions. I exploit bilateral commodity-level data on trade between 
human rights-concerned countries and human rights violators between 
1972 and 2005. I show that human rights-abusing countries 
exporting energy and nuclear products are sanctioned less often. 
Exports of nuclear goods and armaments by human rights-concerned 
countries to human rights abusers also mitigate the use of sanctions. 
Economic rationales and not geopolitical considerations explain the 
impact of strategic trade on sanction use. 
 
JEL-Codes:  F13, F51, N40 
Keywords:  human rights violations, sanctions, strategic goods, economic 
interdependence, double standards in international relations 
 
1. Introduction 
The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom has put both 
Saudi Arabia and Iran on its Tier 1 “Countries of Particular Concern” list.10 Such 
classification calls for action by the US, the one most commonly applied being 
sanctions imposition. Of the two countries, only Iran is currently under a US 
sanction regime. Saudi Arabia, a long-standing, important US geopolitical ally and 
trade partner, has never been sanctioned by the US. 
                                                          
10 http://www.uscirf.gov/all-countries/countries-of-particular-concern-tier-1  
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Sanctions are one of the strategies used in the international community for 
reducing human rights abuse (Hafner-Burton, 2014). Their ideal goal is to change 
a target country’s behavior through the application of diplomatic and economic 
pressure. Human rights sanctions are imposed for a variety of reasons, ranging 
from political repression and religious persecution by a government, through 
state support for terrorists to instigation of politically and ethnically based 
murders and genocide. Beyond the officially stated or intended policy goals, 
human rights sanctions may have unwanted economic consequences, for both 
the sender and the target of sanctions. Sanctions inflict a “deadweight loss of 
utility” due to lost welfare benefits for all the parties involved (Pape, 1997; Eaton 
and Engers, 1999; Drezner, 2003). Specifically, sanctions may disrupt trade flows 
that are of importance to the countries involved (Hufbauer et. al., 1997).   
Sanctions scholars have often simplified the impact of trade on sanctions by 
modelling it as a simple yes or no question: “Does the volume of bilateral trade 
reduce the probability of sanctions?”. I claim that trade interdependence is more 
complex than the volume of bilateral trade employed in previous studies. In this 
paper, I examine whether sanctions are less likely to be initiated when – inter alia 
– strategic economic relations between the potential sender country and target 
country are stronger. Does the trade in strategic goods, such as natural resources, 
armaments or high tech goods decrease the likelihood of sanctions imposition? 
I combine country-pair-level data on sanctions imposition with product-level 
bilateral trade flows, in a panel of 43 sanctioning countries and 91 human rights-
violating countries between 1972 and 2005. I find that human rights-concerned 
countries turn more often a blind eye on human rights abuses in countries with 
which they engage in strategic goods trade. Human-rights-abusing countries are 
less likely to be sanctioned if they import nuclear materials and armaments or 
export energy and nuclear products from potential sanction senders. I then 
deepen the analysis by exploring alternative explanations for the mitigating 
impact of strategic goods trade on sanctions imposition. The differential 
treatment of human rights abusers may be due to rational economic calculations 
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or may be rooted in political concerns. My analysis shows that human rights-
protecting countries sanction less often those states on which they depend more 
for trade with strategic goods. They also treat in a milder way strategic goods 
trade partners when the trade relationship is not easily substitutable. Finally, I find 
no evidence that strong rivalry in a strategic good market has an impact on 
sanctions initiation. When examining a possible political explanation, my findings 
reveal the a geopolitical partnership, measured by UN voting similarity between the 
potential sanction sender and potential sanction target, does not explain the 
impact of strategic trade on sanctions. 
The literature relating trade to sanctions has not reached a consensus on the 
effect of trade on the decision to initiate a sanction. Several studies have found 
that trade reduces the probability of sanction initiation (Early, 2011; McLean and 
Whang, 2010). Others claim trade not to be relevant at all for the decision to 
initiate a sanction (Von Soest and Wahmann, 2015). I offer a fresh micro-data-
driven answer to the question of how trade affects sanctions imposition by 
demonstrating that trade enters the sanction-making process in a more subtle 
way than the one researchers have previously employed. Whereas existing studies 
use total bilateral trade flows, I argue that it is not the volume of trade per se that 
governs the decision to sanction but the strategic nature of the trade pattern. The 
importance of a trade relationship depends on how valuable the goods being 
traded are to the trade partners. Losing a supplier of 1 billion dollars’ worth of 
oil has different implications than losing a supplier of 1 billion dollars’ worth of 
toys. 
I also contribute to the literature linking economic interdependence – in terms 
of trade flows, capital flows, foreign direct investment and cross-border bank 
lending – to the use of sanctions in particular and motivation of sanctions 
imposition in general. To this end, scholars have identified the level of economic 
interdependence and the relative economic capabilities between a sender and a 
target as crucial for the decision to initiate a sanction (Cox and Drury, 2006; 
Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, 2008). There is also evidence that geopolitical 
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alignment and similarity of the political regimes between target and sender might 
affect the decision to initiate sanctions (Drezner, 1998; Drury, 2000; Lektzian and 
Souva, 2003; Cox and Drury, 2006; Goenner, 2007). My results support the 
hypothesis that economic interdependencies affect sanctions. While I do not find 
political proximity between countries to be relevant, I exploit the pattern of 
economic interdependence – dependence, substitutability and rivalry between the 
sender and the target – and show that those matter for sanctions imposition.  
My results also speak to the literature exploring whether aid donors consider 
human rights abuses in the recipient states. There are some indications that 
human rights sanctions are rarely applied to countries that are geopolitically 
aligned with their donors (Tomasevski, 1997; Barratt, 2008). Yet others find that 
human rights protection is rewarded by aid donors (Cingraneli and Pasquarello, 
1985; Poe, 1992; Berthelemy, 2006). Still, the overwhelming majority of 
contributions on human rights sanctions and aid find that strategic political 
considerations are at play (Neumayer, 2003; Rioux and Van Belle, 2005; Barratt, 
2008). My paper shows that the relationship between human rights sanctions and 
trade is governed by economic concerns and not by political ones. 
A simple comparison of strategic goods trade between human rights-promoting 
and human rights-abusing countries illustrates why one might perceive human 
rights sanctions as influenced by strategic goods trade. Human rights-promoting 
countries have exported relatively more non-ferrous metals, electronics, 
armaments and nuclear goods to human rights abusers that they have not 
sanctioned (Figure 3.1). On the other hand, exports of energy and chemicals have 
been relatively higher to those human rights-mistreating countries, which the 
human rights promoters have sanctioned. Imports of strategic goods are higher 
from non-sanctioned human rights violators for all strategic product groups but 
non-ferrous metals, i.e., energy, chemicals, electronics, nuclear goods and 
armaments (Figure 3.2).  
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FIGURE 3. 1: HUMAN RIGHTS-CONCERNED COUNTRIES' EXPORTS TO 
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS 
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Whereas exports in non-strategic goods barely differ between the two groups, 
human rights-concerned countries import relatively less non-strategic goods 
from human rights-violating countries which they do not sanction (Figure 3.3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3. 2: HUMAN RIGHTS-CONCERNED COUNTRIES' IMPORTS FROM 
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS 
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This paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I outline the nexus between human 
rights sanctions and strategic trade. Section 3 describes the data whereas section 
4 and section 5 provide the econometric specification and the main result, 
respectively. Section 6 tests for possible explanatory mechanisms driving the 
main results whereas section 7 provides robustness checks. Section 8 concludes. 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3. 3: HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNED COUNTRIES' TRADE WITH 
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS 
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2. Background on human rights sanctions and trade in strategic 
products 
Human rights sanctions take the form of either trade restrictions – import and 
export restrictions, blockades, quotas, licensing requirements – or other 
economic measures which may indirectly affect trade – termination of foreign 
aid, foreign assets freeze, conditions on government procurement, travel bans. 
Human rights sanctions have been employed for several purposes. They may be 
imposed to express the sender country’s distaste for human rights abuses, to 
prevent a human rights-abusing state from acquiring needed goods, to punish a 
country for its human rights abuses or to generate pressure and alienate supporter 
countries of human rights-violating states. 
However, human rights-protecting countries may apply sanctions selectively. 
Most obviously, countries may not engage in sanctioning of states with which 
they have strategic partnership, e.g., through a military alliance or through 
informal coalitions within international institutions such as the United Nations 
(Dreher et. al., 2008). Moreover, several studies link economic interdependence 
to the use of sanctions. While in some studies trade does have a mitigating role 
on the probability of sanction (Cox and Drury, 2006; Crescenzi, 2003; Drury et. 
al., 2014; Goenner, 2007; Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, 2008; Lektzian and 
Souva, 2003), it turns out to be not important in others (Von Soest and Wahman, 
2015). These studies have typically used the total volume of bilateral trade or total 
bilateral imports or exports to proxy for economic interdependence between 
countries. This approach, however, does not account for the different inherent 
strategic value of some goods. A billion dollars’ worth of toys imports from 
China are valued differently by the US than a billion dollars’ worth of oil imports 
from Saudi Arabia. A disaggregation of the goods traded allows to uncover to 
which trade flow disruptions a country is indeed vulnerable (Gasiorowski, 1986). 
A country is more vulnerable to a trade breakdown if it has only a few trade 
partners or trades goods with a few substitutes. Hence, whether the interruption 
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of trade leaves a country vulnerable depends on the composition of trade and on 
the specific trade patterns. 
The political science literature classifies strategic goods as those which are crucial 
for the economic and military strength of a country. There have been several 
contributions in the literature as regards to the definition and categorization of 
strategic goods. According to Sen (1984), strategic products ensure the self-
sustained economic growth of a country. The author designates the following 
industries as strategic – iron and steel, chemicals, textiles, machinery, paper 
products and transport equipment – due to their backward and forward linkages 
to other industries, economies of scale and importance for the growth of the 
whole economy. Ripsman and Blanchard (1996) characterize products as 
strategic if they are crucial for survival, sourced from abroad, their share in the 
total trade volume of a country is high, and their substitutability is low. Goenner 
(2010) integrates these arguments to classify strategic goods as belonging to one 
of the following categories – energy, non-ferrous metals, chemicals, electronics, 
nuclear materials and armaments. These categories account for both scarcity of 
production or occurrence and are of importance to a nation’s economic and 
military security. For example, non-ferrous metals and energy products are 
substantial production inputs for any economy and are at the same time 
concentrated among few suppliers. Other commodities, such as weapons and 
nuclear materials can provide military strength or threaten another country’s 
existence and are likely to be traded only with geopolitically aligned countries. 
Non-ferrous metals are scarce in their occurrence and are indispensable for the 
production of steel, electronics, chemicals and durable goods. Energy products 
include oil, natural gas, coal and electricity. Chemicals include organic and 
inorganic chemicals. Electronic products include electrical machinery and 
apparatus, professional scientific and controlling instruments and 
telecommunications equipment. Nuclear goods contain radioactive materials as 
well as nuclear reactors and parts. Armaments consist of weapons, armored 
vehicles, warships, aircraft and helicopters. I follow Goenner’s (2010) strategic 
goods classification in my analysis. 
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Decomposing trade in strategic and non-strategic accounts for the content of 
trade and its impact on sanctions. But it does not answer the question as to why 
exactly particular products may or may not influence the decision to initiate a 
sanction. Countries trade in strategic goods also partly in order to influence the 
behavior of other countries and to create dependencies. Thus, geopolitical allies 
may trade more intensively in strategic goods and also sanction each other less 
often. On the other hand, (not) sanctioning because of trade may be driven by 
purely economic considerations. Countries may differ in the degree of 
dependence they have on a given strategic good supplier. Strategic goods also 
vary in the degree of their production and occurrence concentration, and hence 
their trade partner substitutability. Moreover, states exposed to fierce 
competition in a strategic good market may be less eager to cut off existing trade 
ties. Hence, in section 6 I check whether the political interaction within a country 
pair does a better job at explaining the impact of trade on sanctions than 
economic interdependencies. 
  
3. Data 
To test whether there is a strategic trade bias in the decision to initiate a sanction 
case against a human rights-abusing country, I combine country-pair-level data 
on sanctions imposition with product-level trade flows between 43 sanction-
initiating countries and 91 human rights violators between 1972 and 2005.  
 
3.1       Dependent variable: human rights sanction case 
Data on human rights sanctions comes from the Threat and Imposition of 
Economic Sanctions dataset, by Morgan, Bapat and Kobayashi (2014). The data 
has been collected via human search in Lexis-Nexis, Facts on File, Keesing’s 
Record of World Events, the New York Times index, and the London Times 
index. Sanctions are defined as actions a country undertakes to reduce or cut its 
economic ties with a target country, aiming thereby to change the target country’s 
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behavior or policies.  I use sanctions case data from 1972 until 2005, which 
renders a total of 167 sanction cases. My dependent variable is human rights 
sanction case start, which implies either the imposition of a sanction or the 
official declaration of a sanction threat.  
A sanction-initiating country is a country that has initiated at least one human 
rights sanction case throughout the sample period. Table 3.1 reveals that the US 
has a remarkable dominance as a human rights sanction sender in the 
international community. 
 
TABLE 3. 1: HUMAN RIGHTS SANCTIONS SENDERS 
Sanction sender Frequency % 
United States of America 54 32.34 
United Kingdom 14 8.38 
France 13 7.78 
Germany 12 7.19 
Canada 11 6.59 
Japan 6 3.59 
Australia 5 2.99 
Libya 3 1.80 
Iraq 3 1.80 
Saudi Arabia 3 1.80 
Kuwait 3 1.80 
Belgium 2 1.20 
Spain 2 1.20 
Italy 2 1.20 
Russia 2 1.20 
Sweden 2 1.20 
Algeria 2 1.20 
Syria 2 1.20 
New Zealand 2 1.20 
Venezuela 1 0.60 
Argentina 1 0.60 
Ireland 1 0.60 
Netherlands 1 0.60 
Switzerland 1 0.60 
Czechoslovakia 1 0.60 
Albania 1 0.60 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1 0.60 
Greece 1 0.60 
Finland 1 0.60 
Norway 1 0.60 
Denmark 1 0.60 
Nigeria 1 0.60 
Central African Republic 1 0.60 
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Chad 1 0.60 
Congo 1 0.60 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 1 0.60 
Kenya 1 0.60 
Tanzania 1 0.60 
Burundi 1 0.60 
Rwanda 1 0.60 
Ethiopia 1 0.60 
China 1 0.60 
India 1 0.60 
Total 167 100.00 
 
For each year, I define a country to be a human rights violator if the country has 
received the rating “partly free” or “not free” by the human rights-specializing 
non-governmental organization Freedom House. This indicates that a country 
has engaged in considerable violations of either political rights – electoral process, 
political pluralism and participation and functioning of the government – or of 
civil liberties – freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational 
rights, rule of law and personal autonomy and individual rights (Freedom House, 
2018). The sample of human rights-violating countries, ever sanctioned or not, 
appears in Table 3.2.  
As data on human rights violations is available only after 1972, I restrict my 
analysis to the post-1972 period. Sanctions data is available only up until 2005 
and thus provides the upper time limit of my study.  
 
TABLE 3. 2: HUMAN RIGHTS-VIOLATING COUNTRIES 
Sanctioned countries Sanction 
frequency 
Non-sanctioned countries 
Zimbabwe 16 United States 
Israel 12 Cuba 
Haiti 10 Dominican Republic 
Uganda 10 Mexico 
Burundi 8 Honduras 
China, P.R.: Mainland 7 Panama 
Portugal 6 Colombia 
Turkey 6 Venezuela, Republica Bolivariana de 
Vietnam 6 Suriname 
Peru 5 Ecuador 
Chile 5 Hungary 
Yugoslavia 5 Czechoslovakia 
68                                                            Strategic goods trade bias in human rights sanctions 
 
South Africa 5 Albania 
Cambodia 5 Croatia 
Congo, Democratic Republic of 4 Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Indonesia 4 Georgia 
Guatemala 3 Azerbaijan, Republic of 
Togo 3 Equatorial Guinea 
Nigeria 3 Senegal 
Bangladesh 3 Mauritania 
Russian Federation 2 Guinea 
Cote d'Ivoire 2 Liberia 
Ethiopia 2 Sierra Leone 
Iraq 2 Cameroon 
India 2 Central African Republic 
Myanmar 2 Chad 
El Salvador 1 Congo, Republic of 
Nicaragua 1 Kenya 
Brazil 1 Rwanda 
Bolivia 1 Somalia 
Paraguay 1 Eritrea 
Argentina 1 Angola 
Uruguay 1 Mozambique 
Sudan 1 Namibia 
Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of 1 Morocco 
Uzbekistan 1 Algeria 
Pakistan 1 Libya 
Sri Lanka 1 Iran, Islamic Republic of 
Thailand 1 Egypt 
  Syrian Arab Republic 
  Lebanon 
  Yemen 
  Yemen, P.D. Rep. 
  Kuwait 
  Tajikistan 
  Korea, Democratic People's Rep. of 
  Bhutan 
  Nepal 
  Lao People's Democratic Republic 
  Malaysia 
  Philippines 
  Papua New Guinea 
 
3.2     Bilateral trade flows 
Data on bilateral trade flows on a product level has been originally collected by 
the United Nations and is made available through the UN COMTRADE 
database. I use a modified version of this original database with corrections made 
by Hausmann et. al. (2014). It includes exports and imports on a bilateral basis 
between all countries in the world, classified using the Standard Industry Trade 
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Classification (SITC), revision 2, at the four-digit level, between 1962 and 2017. 
By using product-level trade data, I can attend to the composition of trade and 
its strategic value to the trading countries. In order to classify products as strategic 
or non-strategic I rely on categorization provided by Goenner (2010), shown in 
Table 3.3. 
 
TABLE 3. 3: STRATEGIC PRODUCTS CLASSIFICATION 
Strategic 
category 
Commodity SITC 
Code 
Description 
Energy 32 Coal, coke and briquettes 
 33 Petroleum, petroleum products and related 
material 
 34 Gas: natural and manufactured 
 35 Electric current 
Non-ferrous 287 Ores & concentrates of base metals n.e.s. 
metals 681 Silver, platinum & other metals of the platinum 
group 
 682 Copper 
 683 Nickel 
 684 Aluminum 
 685 Lead 
 686 Zinc 
 687 Tin 
 689 Misc. non-ferrous base metals employed in 
metallurgy 
Chemicals 51 Organic chemicals 
 522 Inorganic chemical elements, oxides and 
halogen salts 
 523 Other inorganic chemicals 
Electronics 87 Professional, scientific and controlling 
instruments 
 764 Telecommunications equipment and parts 
 77 Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances 
n.e.s. 
Nuclear 286 Ores and concentrates of uranium and thorium 
 524 Radio-active and associated materials 
 7187 Nuclear reactors and parts 
Armaments 792 Aircraft and associated equipment and parts 
 7931 Warships of all kinds 
 9510 Armored fighting vehicles, arms of war and 
ammunition 
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3.3     Control variables 
Since human rights sanctions are driven by both economic and political 
considerations, I make extensive use of trade and politics-related variables. I 
include the number of GATT/WTO members and the number of trade disputes 
in a country pair. International trade organizations give a platform for members 
to sort out any trade policy-related frictions, hence I expect that membership of 
both countries within the GATT/WTO would decrease the probability of 
sanction. Being engaged in a trade dispute signals a deterioration of trade 
relations which may facilitate trade disruption through sanction initiation. Data 
for these two variables came from the WTO. Then, to account for the influence 
of preferential trade agreements on both bilateral trade flows and the probability 
to sanction, I use the Economic Integration Agreements data by Baier and 
Bergstrand (2016) which runs from 1949 till 2016. Other variables accounting for 
bilateral trade facilitation and bilateral political relations such as contiguity and 
colonial links are taken from the CEPII bilateral distance database.   
The level of democracy in each country is measured by a democracy index 
provided by the Polity IV Project. Additionally, I control for the level of human 
rights abuses in the following two ways. First, I include an index measuring the 
level of human rights abuses in a country for each year. The index comes from 
the Freedom House database. Second, I include an event-based variable – 
political or ethnic-based murders in a country for a given year – to account for 
spikes in human rights abuses which may be more recognizable in the 
international community. The data for this variable comes from the Political 
Instability Task Force.  
Finally, I control for upcoming elections as foreign policy topics such as 
sanctions tend to gain particular attention in electoral years. Data on those comes 
from the National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy dataset by Hyde 
and Marinov (2017).  
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4. Modeling the determinants of human rights sanctions 
I examine whether there is a strategic product bias in the decision to initiate a 
human rights sanction case. For this purpose, I estimate the determinants of 
human rights sanction 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻_𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 using OLS: 
𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻_𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃)=  𝛽𝛽0 +  𝛽𝛽1𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽2𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1 +  𝛽𝛽3 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑃𝑃−1) +  𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1+ 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑃𝑃 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 
      (3.1) 
where 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a categorical variable classifying products according to the 
seven strategic goods categories following Goenner (2010): energy, non-ferrous 
metals, chemicals, electronics, nuclear, armaments and non-strategic products. 
The variable 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1  stands in for either  𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1 or 
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1 , i.e., for bilateral export and import flows at the product level; 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑃𝑃−1) is a vector that contains time-varying and time-invariant bilateral 
economic and political control variables; 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1 and 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1 are vectors representing 
time-varying control variables for the human rights-concerned and human rights-
violating countries respectively, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  are human rights-concerned country-fixed 
effects, 𝜏𝜏𝑃𝑃 are year-fixed effects and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 is the error term. The errors may be 
correlated at the sanction-sending country-year level, which is why I allow for 
clustering at that level. The sample runs from 1972 to 2005.  
My identification strategy exploits the following three sources of variation in the 
dependent variable: (1) difference in the sanction probability between human 
rights-abusing countries, (2) changes in sanction probability within human rights-
abusing countries, and (3) differences in sanction probability between human 
rights-concerned countries for the same human rights-violating country at a given 
point in time. Since sanction occurrence in the data set is quite sparse (1.8%), I 
choose specification (3.1) as my baseline in order to identify the coefficients 
based on all three sources of variation. 
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5. Results 
5.1 Benchmark  
To test whether human rights sanctions show evidence for strategic product bias, 
I interact bilateral exports and imports with a strategic product indicator. Table 
3.4 provides the main OLS results.  
Exports of non-strategic goods from human rights-concerned countries to 
human rights-abusing countries increase the probability of human rights 
sanction. This can be seen from the positive coefficient on log trade, sender to target, 
t-1 in column (1), which is statistically significant at the 5% level.  A 100% increase 
in non-strategic exports increases the probability of human rights sanction by 
0.09 percentage points. The increase in sanction probability becomes more 
pronounced for chemicals and electronics. For chemicals, a 100% increase in 
exports will increase the probability of human rights sanction by 0.17 percentage 
points relative to exports in non-strategic goods. The total effect for chemicals is 
equal to 0.26 percentage points increase in sanction probability (0.09+0.17). A 
100% increase in exports in electronics will increase the probability of human 
rights sanction by 0.06 percentage points relative to exports of non-strategic 
goods. The total effect for electronic goods is equal to a 0.15 percentage points 
increase in sanction probability (0.09+0.06). 
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TABLE 3. 4: STRATEGIC PRODUCTS BIAS IN HUMAN RIGHTS 
SANCTIONS 
 Exports Imports 
 (1) (2) 
   
log trade, sender to target, t-1 0.0009** 0.0016** 
 (0.0004) (0.0006) 
Energy # log trade, sender to target, t-1 0.0001 -0.0026** 
 (0.0004) (0.0011) 
Non-ferrous metal # log trade, sender to target, t-1 0.0004 -0.0014 
 (0.0005) (0.0009) 
Chemicals # log trade, sender to target, t-1 0.0017*** 0.0014* 
 (0.0006) (0.0008) 
Electronics # log trade, sender to target, t-1 0.0006** -0.0005 
 (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Nuclear # log trade, sender to target, t-1 -0.0022** -0.0026* 
 (0.0011) (0.0015) 
Armaments # log trade, sender to target, t-1 -0.0013** -0.0008 
 (0.0006) (0.0011) 
Non-interacted main explanatory variables yes yes 
Control variables yes yes 
Sender FE yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes 
R-squared 0.32 0.41 
N 1,659,158 645,267 
 
Whereas higher exports of the human-rights concerned countries to the human-
rights violating countries and the probability of sanction are positively associated 
for non-strategic goods, chemicals and electronics, this relationship is less 
strongly pronounced for exports of nuclear goods and armaments. Exports of 
these two type of goods actually lower the probability of sanction. The total effect 
for nuclear goods is equal to -0.13 percentage points decrease in probability to 
sanction (0.09-0.22), whereas the total effect for armaments is equal to -0.04 
percentage points decrease in sanction probability (0.09-0.13).  
Notes: Dependent variable: initiation of a human rights sanction case at the country-pair-year 
level. The variable “log trade” is a placeholder for log exports of sender to target (column 
(1)) and log imports of sender from target (column (2)). Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Standard errors are clustered at sender-year level. All regression include a full set of 
uninteracted variables from which the interaction terms are constructed and the following 
control variables: contiguity, common colonizer, number of members of GATT/WTO in 
the country pair, trade dispute within the country pair, election year in sender country, 
democracy level in sender country, democracy level in target country, human rights abuse 
index in target country, political and ethnic murders in target country. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, 
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What is the impact of imports of human-rights concerned countries from 
human-rights abusing countries on the likelihood of the former to initiate a 
sanction case? These results are presented in the second column of Table 3.4. 
The higher the imports of non-strategic goods, the higher the sanction likelihood.  
A 100% increase in non-strategic imports will increase the probability of human 
rights sanction by 0.16 percentage points. This positive association is even more 
pronounced for imports of chemicals. Chemicals increase the probability for a 
sanction by a total of 0.30 percentage points (0.16+0.14).  
Energy and nuclear product imports have an even stronger pronounced, negative 
effect on the probability of sanction. As compared to imports of non-strategic 
goods, sanctioning countries are on average 0.26 percentage points less likely to 
initiate a sanction if imports of energy products increase by 100%. This implies 
that the total effect of energy imports on sanction probability is -0.16 percentage 
points (0.10-0.26), thus reversing the positive relationship between imports and 
sanctions. The same is true for nuclear goods. Their imports lower the probability 
for a sanction initiation by 0.26 percentage points (for an increase by 100% in 
nuclear imports). The total effect of nuclear imports on sanction likelihood is 
thus equal to -0.16 percentage points (0.10-0.26). 
Taken together, this is strong evidence in favor of strategic product trade partners 
receiving a milder treatment for human rights abuses. This is true for importers 
of nuclear and military products and exporters of energy and nuclear products. 
Of note is also the fiercer attitude towards importers of chemicals and electronics 
and exporters of chemicals. This may imply that these products are not 
considered strategic by the sanctioning country, either because it is capable of 
producing them by itself or due to the existence of adequate further suppliers of 
these goods. I provide some insights on these hypotheses in section 6. 
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5.2 Non-linear model 
My regressions so far estimate equation (3.1) as a linear probability model. To 
test whether my results are robust to a non-linear specification, Table (3.5) 
presents results from a pooled probit estimation. They are qualitatively similar to 
the OLS results. Whereas exports of chemicals and electronics increase the 
probability of a sanction initiation, nuclear and military goods exports decrease 
the likelihood of a sanction. Imports of energy and nuclear products are also 
negatively associated with the probability of a sanction. 
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TABLE 3. 5: STRATEGIC PRODUCTS BIAS IN HUMAN RIGHTS 
SANCTIONS, POOLED PROBIT ESTIMATION 
 Exports Imports 
 (1) (2) 
   
Log trade, sender to target, t-1 0.0209*** 0.0243*** 
 (0.0077) (0.0080) 
Energy # log trade, sender to target, t-1 0.0008 -0.0384** 
 (0.0088) (0.0178) 
Non-ferrous metal # log trade, sender to target, t-1 0.0063 -0.0233 
 (0.0092) (0.0146) 
Chemicals # log trade, sender to target, t-1 0.0359*** 0.0137 
 (0.0104) (0.0094) 
Electronics # log trade, sender to target, t-1 0.0134** -0.0077 
 (0.0062) (0.0079) 
Nuclear # log trade, sender to target, t-1 -0.0462** -0.0514** 
 (0.0226) (0.0227) 
Armaments # log trade, sender to target, t-1 -0.0283** -0.0144 
 (0.0126) (0.0228) 
Non-interacted main explanatory variables yes yes 
Control variables yes yes 
Sender FE yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes 
N 1,659,158 645,267 
 
5.3 US specification 
By pooling all human rights-concerned countries in one regression I have so far 
implicitly assumed that each country weighs all human rights-abusing countries-
specific factors in the same way, as I was estimating one single coefficient per 
explanatory variable. However, one single country – USA – makes for around 
30% of all human rights sanction case initiations and hence may differ in its 
attitude towards human rights abuses from other, more sporadically sanctioning 
Notes: Dependent variable: initiation of a human rights sanction case at the country-pair-year 
level. The variable “log trade” is a placeholder for log exports of sender to target (column 
(1)) and log imports of sender from target (column (2)). Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Standard errors are clustered at sender-year level. All regression include a full set of 
uninteracted variables from which the interaction terms are constructed and the following 
control variables: contiguity, common colonizer, number of members of GATT/WTO in 
the country pair, trade dispute within the country pair, election year in sender country, 
democracy level in sender country, democracy level in target country, human rights abuse 
index in target country, political and ethnic murders in target country. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, 
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countries. Therefore, I run an individual regression for the US and another one 
for the other sanction-initiating countries. Table 3.6 provides insights in the 
sanctions motivation for the US. The table highlights that only two types of 
products are relevant for the sanction decision of the US – armaments and energy 
products. Whereas a 100% increase in arms exports decreases the probability of 
sanction against a human rights-violating country by 0.20 percentage points, US 
energy imports from such countries decrease the sanction likelihood by 0.54 
percentage points, relative to nonstrategic exports and imports. The total effects 
are then equal to -0.08 percentage points for arms exports and -0.22 percentage 
points for energy imports. 
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TABLE 3. 6: STRATEGIC PRODUCTS BIAS IN HUMAN RIGHTS 
SANCTIONS: US VS. NON-US SENDER 
 Sender: US Sender: Non-US 
 Exports Imports Exports Imports 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Log trade, sender to target, t-1 0.0012 0.0032* 0.0008* 0.0010* 
 (0.0007) (0.0016) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
Energy # log trade, sender to target, t-1 0.0002 -0.0054* 0.0003 -0.0016 
 (0.0008) (0.0030) (0.0005) (0.0010) 
Non-ferrous metal # log trade, sender 
to target, t-1 
-0.0006 -0.0035 0.0010* -0.0002 
 (0.0009) (0.0023) (0.0006) (0.0007) 
Chemicals # log trade, sender to target, 
t-1 
0.0022 0.0001 0.0014** 0.0016* 
 (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0006) (0.0009) 
Electronics # log trade, sender to target, 
t-1 
0.0014 0.0003 0.0003 -
0.0009*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Nuclear # log trade, sender to target, t-1 -0.0024 -0.0023 -0.0017 -0.0031** 
 (0.0017) (0.0035) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
Armaments # log trade, sender to 
target, t-1 
-0.0020* -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0007 
 (0.0012) (0.0018) (0.0006) (0.0010) 
Non-interacted main explanatory 
variables 
yes yes yes yes 
Control variables yes yes yes yes 
Sender FE yes yes yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes 
R-squared 0.39 0.34 0.23 0.32 
N 487,788 183,025 1,171,370 462,242 
The results for the other countries (all but the US) show preference for different 
strategic goods. Column (3) and (4) of Table 3.6 reveal that both non-ferrous 
metals and chemicals exports increase the probability for a human rights 
sanction, beyond the positive effect of non-strategic exports on sanction 
probability. On average, a 100% increase in the exports of non-ferrous metals 
Notes: Dependent variable: initiation of a human rights sanction case at the country-pair-year 
level. The variable “log trade” is a placeholder for log exports of sender to target (columns (1)) 
and (3) and log imports of sender from target (columns (2) and (4)). Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at sender-year level. All regression include a full set 
of uninteracted variables from which the interaction terms are constructed and the following 
control variables: contiguity, common colonizer, number of members of GATT/WTO in the 
country pair, trade dispute within the country pair, election year in sender country, democracy 
level in sender country, democracy level in target country, human rights abuse index in target 
country, political and ethnic murders in target country. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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leads to a total increase in sanction probability of 0.18 percentage points 
(0.08+0.10). For chemicals this value is 0.22 percentage points (0.08+0.10). 
Imports of chemicals from human rights-abusing countries also increase sanction 
probability, whereas imports of electronics and nuclear products have a negative 
effect, as compared to non-strategic imports. Of these last two, only imports of 
nuclear products are so strongly negatively associated with sanction likelihood as 
to reverse the positive association of imports and sanction probability into a 
negative one. The total effect for nuclear products is equal to -0.21 percentage 
points (0.10-0.31). The total effect for electronics is positive and equal to 0.01 
percentage points (0.10-0.09). 
Taken together, the results from Table 3.6 indicate that both the US and the 
group of the occasionally sanctioning countries are influenced by strategic 
products trade in their decision to initiate a sanction case. Given that for different 
countries different products are of strategic importance, it is only natural that I 
find differences in the strategic products being statistically significant among the 
results for the US and the other countries. 
Overall, I reject the null hypothesis of unbiased human rights sanctions. 
Countries sanction less often human rights violators that deliver certain strategic 
goods – specifically nuclear and energy products. Human rights-concerned 
countries also turn more often a blind eye on human rights abuses in countries 
to which they export armaments and nuclear goods. Exports and imports of 
chemicals and electronics actually increase the likelihood of a sanction. 
 
6. Exploration of transmission channels 
This section explores the channels of transmission of the strategic trade bias in a 
more detailed way. Both economic and geopolitical reasons may be behind the 
observed effect of strategic trade on the decision to sanction, hence these are 
going to be examined in the following subsections. 
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Human rights sanctions may harm a sanction sender’s export and import 
interests. In particular, I discriminate between trade dependence, market rivalry 
and substitutability of the trade relationship as well as non-economic factors as 
moderating the effect of strategic trade on human rights sanctions.  
 
6.1 Dependence 
If production in a sanctioning country strongly depends on inputs from another 
country or a large share of its exports in a strategic product are absorbed by a 
single market, then the potential sanction sender may be less eager to initiate a 
sanction case against that particular country. These import and export dependencies 
are the primary potential risks that stem from a disruption of trade flows with a 
strategic trade partner. 
In order to measure the dependence of a human rights concerned country from 
human rights-violating country in terms of exports and imports of strategic goods 
I use the following two measures. First, I measure to what degree the human 
rights-violating country is an important import or export partner of the 
sanctioning country for a particular strategic good. Specifically, I use the 
following import and export ratios: 
𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1
𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1
 
 
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1
 
 
where 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1 measures the exports of a sender country i of product k to 
target country j in t-1 and 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1 accounts for the imports of a sender 
country i of a product k from target country j in t-1. 
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These two trade ratios allow to account for the relative importance of a trade 
partner for each strategic product. They measure the previous period dependence 
of a sanctioning country from its potential target. On the basis of these indicators, 
I can account for the vulnerability of a potential sanction sender to a disruption 
in imports or exports of strategic goods. 
Rerunning specification (3.1) with these export and import ratios instead of 
logged bilateral import and export flows reveals suggestive evidence on the role 
of trade interdependencies for the sanction decision (Table 3.7). The higher the 
dependence of the potential sanction sender from the potential sanction target 
as a destination for its armaments and nuclear products, the lower the probability 
of sanction. A change in the nuclear products exports ratio by 0.10 is estimated 
to decrease the probability for a human rights sanction by 1.3 percentage points 
((0.40-0.53)*0.10*100). An increase in the armaments exports ratio by 0.10 will 
decrease the probability of sanction by 0.2 percentage points ((0.40-
0.42)*0.10*100).  
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TABLE 3. 7: TRADE PARTNER IMPORTANCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
SANCTIONS 
 Exports Imports 
 (1) (2) 
   
Target importance as export market/import supplier, t-1 0.4096 0.7066* 
 (0.2819) (0.4246) 
Energy # Target importance as export market/import 
supplier, t-1 
-0.1304 
(0.2133) 
-0.7872* 
(0.4191) 
 
Non-ferrous metal # Target importance as export 
market/import supplier, t-1 
-0.1616 
(0.1427) 
-0.7073* 
(0.4013) 
 
Chemicals # Target importance as export market/import 
supplier, sender to target, t-1 
0.0336 
(0.1468) 
-0.4391* 
(0.2439) 
 
Electronics # Target importance as export market/import 
supplier, sender to target, t-1 
-0.2180 
(0.1685) 
-0.7337** 
(0.2959) 
 
Nuclear # Target importance as export market/import 
supplier, sender to target, t-1 
-0.5306** 
(0.2654) 
-0.7853* 
(0.4167) 
 
Armaments # Target importance as export market/import 
supplier, sender to target, t-1 
-0.4246* 
(0.2479) 
-0.8513** 
(0.3269) 
 
Non-interacted main explanatory variables yes yes 
Control variables yes yes 
Sender FE yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes 
R-squared 0.28 0.29 
N 1,659,158 645,267 
Turning to import dependence, armaments, electronics, energy and nuclear 
products have a depressing effect on the likelihood for a sanction initiation. An 
increase by 0.10 in the import dependence for armaments of the human rights-
concerned country from the human rights-abusing country decreases the 
probability for sanctioning by 1.5 percentage points ((0.70-0.85)*0.10*100). 
Notes: Dependent variable: initiation of a human rights sanction case at the country-pair-year 
level. In column (1) the regression includes the variable “Target importance as export market 
“ and its interactions, in column (2) the regression includes the variable “Target importance 
as import supplier“ and its interactions. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors 
are clustered at sender-year level. All regression include a full set of uninteracted variables 
from which the interaction terms are constructed and the following control variables: 
contiguity, common colonizer, number of members of GATT/WTO in the country pair, 
trade dispute within the country pair, election year in sender country, democracy level in 
sender country, democracy level in target country, human rights abuse index in target 
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Analogous calculations of the total effects yield a 0.8 percentage points decrease 
for nuclear products, 0.8 percentage points decrease for energy products and 0.3 
percentage points decrease for electronics. While chemicals and non-ferrous 
metals have a mitigating effect of the overall positive effect of imports 
dependence in non-strategic products on the probability for a sanction, it is not 
as strong as to reverse the relationship into a negative effect on sanction 
probability. 
A further way to measure export and import dependence comes with the Balassa 
index. According to the comparative advantage theory which is central to the 
standard Ricardian or Heckscher-Ohlin models of trade, countries increasingly 
export the goods they have a relative advantage in producing and import those 
goods they have a relative disadvantage in producing. To test to what extent 
comparative advantage and disadvantage in strategic products trade are 
determining the decision to initiate a human rights sanction, I need a measure of 
the sender country’s competitiveness in exporting or disadvantage in importing 
a strategic product. To this end, I use Balassa’s (1965) measure of revealed 
comparative advantage: 
 
𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1 = 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1
𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃−1
 
 
where 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1 defines the total exports of country i in a strategic product 
k in year t-1. The revealed comparative advantage index measures the degree of 
specialization of a country in a given product and is a ratio of two ratios. The 
numerator represents country i’s share of world exports in product k. The 
denominator stands for the share of product k in total world exports. Hence, 
Balassa index compares a country’s share of total world exports in product k to 
the aggregate world export share of product k. If the ratio is bigger than one, 
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then the country captures a greater share of world exports in product k than the 
global average, which implies that the country has a comparative advantage in 
producing product k. 
A modified version of Balassa’s revealed comparative advantage index can be 
used to account for the world import share of a country, i.e., the revealed 
comparative dependence of a country for imports of a given product: 
 
𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1 = 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃−1
 
 
where, analogously to above, 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1 stand for the total imports of country 
i in a strategic product k in year t-1, 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1 are country i’s total imports, 
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1 are total world imports of product k and 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃−1 are total 
world imports. A value of the index greater than one means that in that product 
country i imports relatively more than the aggregate global average import share. 
This implies that for the supply of that particular product country i is more 
dependent on imports than the world on average. 
Using the constructed measures from above, I test whether an exporter’s 
comparative advantage in exporting a strategic product or an importer’s 
comparative dependence in importing a strategic product influence the human 
rights sanction probability. The specification is as follows: 
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𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻_𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃)=  𝛽𝛽0 +  𝛽𝛽1𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽2𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅#𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1 +  𝛽𝛽4 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1 + 𝛽𝛽5 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅#𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1 
∗ 𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅#𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1 ∗ 𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅#𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑃𝑃−1) +  𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1 + 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑃𝑃 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃  
     (3.2) 
The variable 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1  stands in for either 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1 or 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1 , 
i.e., for bilateral export and import flows at the product level and the variable 
𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅#𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1 stands in for either 𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1 or 𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1. For ease of interpretation, 
the Balassa indices 𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1 and 𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1 have been dichotomized, i.e., for 
values equal to or above one the indices have been assigned the value 1 and for 
values smaller than one, the indices have been assigned a value of 0. 
In specification (3.2) I allow the effect of strategic goods imports and exports to 
differ depending on the extent to which the exporting country has a comparative 
advantage in product k or the importing country has a comparative dependence 
on product k. If the impact of strategic trade on sanctions is due to comparative 
advantage or comparative dependence in a given product, I expect the three-way 
interaction terms to be statistically significant.  
Estimates of specification (3.2) are reported in Table 3.8. A country’s 
competitiveness is an important factor for the decision to sanction when the 
sanctioning country is exporting non-ferrous metals and armaments. Having a 
comparative advantage in nonferrous metals or armaments significantly reduces 
the probability to initiate a human rights sanction case. The three-way 
interactions with relative important dependence are not statistically significant. 
Taken together, these results suggest that export dependence is particularly 
important for non-ferrous metals and armaments whereas import dependence is 
not affecting the probability to initiate a human rights sanction. 
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TABLE 3. 8: SENDER'S COMPARATIVE 
ADVANTAGE/DEPENDENCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS SANCTIONS 
 Exports Imports 
 (1) (2) 
   
Comparative advantage/dependence of sender, t-1 # Log 
trade, sender to target, t-1 
0.0007*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
 
Energy # Comparative advantage/dependence of sender, t-
1 # Log trade, sender to target, t-1 
-0.0003 
(0.0008) 
0.0009 
(0.0010) 
 
Non-ferrous metal # Comparative advantage/dependence 
of sender, t-1 # Log trade, sender to target, t-1 
-0.0017* 
(0.0009) 
0.0003 
(0.0012) 
 
Chemicals # Comparative advantage/dependence of sender, 
t-1 # Log trade, sender to target, t-1 
-0.0003 
(0.0007) 
-0.0012 
(0.0009) 
 
Electronics # Comparative advantage/dependence of 
sender, t-1 # Log trade, sender to target, t-1 
0.0009 
(0.0006) 
-0.0001 
(0.0005) 
 
Nuclear # Comparative advantage/dependence of sender, t-
1 # Log trade, sender to target, t-1 
-0.0020 
(0.0021) 
0.0057 
(0.0035) 
 
Armaments # Comparative advantage/dependence of 
sender, t-1 # Log trade, sender to target, t-1 
-0.0025** 
(0.0012) 
0.0020 
(0.0018) 
 
Non-interacted main explanatory variables yes yes 
Control variables yes yes 
Sender FE yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes 
R-squared 0.32 0.41 
N 1,659,158 645,267 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: initiation of a human rights sanction case at the country-pair-year 
level. The variable “log trade” is a placeholder for log exports of sender to target (column 
(1)) and log imports of sender from target (column (2)). In column (1) the regression includes 
the variable “Comparative advantage of sender“ and its interactions, in column (2) the 
regression includes the variable “Comparative dependence of sender“ and its interactions. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at sender-year level. All 
regression include a full set of uninteracted variables from which the interaction terms are 
constructed and the following control variables: contiguity, common colonizer, number of 
members of GATT/WTO in the country pair, trade dispute within the country pair, election 
year in sender country, democracy level in sender country, democracy level in target country, 
human rights abuse index in target country, political and ethnic murders in target country. * 
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In sum, a bilateral dependence of the potential sender from the potential target 
has been shown to be important sanction factor for several strategic products 
and for both imports and exports. In contrast, the  dependence of the potential 
sender on the imports and exports of a particular strategic product as measured 
by the Balassa indices has delivered only sparse evidence for impact, specifically 
in the product groups non-ferrous metals and armaments and only for exports. 
 
6.2 Substitutability 
Not every sanction comes along with the same price tag.  The potential effect 
from loss of trade is larger when the trade partner is not easily substitutable. The 
opportunity costs of sanctioning would be higher and the human rights-
propagating country reluctant to initiate a sanction in such a case. Especially for 
strategic goods, some countries are hardly substitutable as suppliers of imports 
or destinations for exports, while other trade partners of non-strategic goods can 
easily be replaced. Hence, I need a measure of the substitutability of a trade 
relationship. 
 To assess the degree of substitutability, the following two measures are 
computed: the world market share of each trade partner in each product and the 
number of countries that export or import each product as a share of the total 
number of countries in the world. The second measure is referred to as ubiquity, 
borrowing from the work on product ubiquity by Hidalgo and Hausmann (2010). 
The world export and import shares can be expressed in the following simple 
way: 
 
𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤 = 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1  
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𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤 = 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1  
 
where 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1 measures the total exports of a potential target in a product 
k in t-1 and 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1 measures the total world exports in product k in year 
t-1. Further, import and export ubiquity is defined as: 
 
𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 = 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃−1𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃−1  
 
𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒 = 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃−1𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃−1  
 
To test whether the degree of substitutability of strategic products trade partners 
has an effect on the probability of human rights sanction, the following 
specifications are employed: 
𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻_𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃)=  𝛽𝛽0 +  𝛽𝛽1𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽2𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤 +  𝛽𝛽4 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
∗ 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1 + 𝛽𝛽5 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
∗ 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1 
∗ 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤+ 𝛽𝛽7𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1 
∗ 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤 +  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑃𝑃−1) +  𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1 + 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖+ 𝜏𝜏𝑃𝑃 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃  
(3.3) 
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𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻_𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃)=  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽2𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 +  𝛽𝛽4 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1 + 𝛽𝛽5 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1 
∗ 𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒+ 𝛽𝛽7𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1 ∗ 𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒+ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑃𝑃−1) +  𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1 + 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑃𝑃 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃  
        
(3.4) 
The specifications dealing with world import share and ubiquity of importers are 
constructed in analogous way. The results from these estimations are provided 
in Tables 3.9 and 3.10. The degree of substitutability of a trade partner as an 
export market is statistically significant for non-ferrous metals and electronics 
when substitutability is measured by world import and exports shares of the 
target. In these product groups, a higher world import share of a potential target 
country will lower the sanction probability by a potential sanction-initiating 
country which exports these product groups. On the import side, a human rights-
promoting country which imports non-ferrous metals from a human rights-
violating country would be less eager to initiate a sanction if the potential target 
holds a large share of the world non-ferrous metal exports. When accounting for 
ubiquity of exporters and importers, a statistically significant relationship exists 
for electronics exports. If there are numerous other importers of electronics, then 
a human rights-concerned country will be more likely to initiate a sanction against 
a human rights violating country to which it exports electronics. When it comes 
to imports, results are less intuitive. A higher number of exporters decreases the 
probability of sanction for a potential sanction sender importing chemicals from 
a potential sanction target. 
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TABLE 3. 9: TARGET'S WORLD MARKET SHARE AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS SANCTIONS 
 Exports Imports 
 (1) (2) 
   
World import/export share of target, t-1 # Log trade, 
sender to target, t-1 
0.0190** 
(0.0081) 
0.0037 
(0.0060) 
 
Energy # World import/export share of target, t-1 # Log 
trade, sender to target, t-1 
-0.0347 
(0.0274) 
-0.0182 
(0.0129) 
 
Non-ferrous metal # World import/export share of target, 
t-1  # Log trade, sender to target, t-1 
-0.0249*** 
(0.0075) 
-0.0226* 
(0.0116) 
 
Chemicals # World import/export share of target, t-1 # 
Log trade, sender to target, t-1 
0.0128 
(0.0143) 
0.0112 
(0.0140) 
 
Electronics # World import/export share of target, t-1  # 
Log trade, sender to target, t-1 
-0.0194*** 
(0.0064) 
-0.0120 
(0.0114) 
 
Nuclear # World import/export share of target, t-1 # Log 
trade, sender to target, t-1 
-0.0421 
(0.0314) 
-0.0006 
(0.0316) 
 
Armaments # World import/export share of target, t-1 # 
Log trade, sender to target, t-1 
-0.0199 
(0.0168) 
-0.0007 
(0.0188) 
 
Non-interacted main explanatory variables yes yes 
Control variables yes yes 
Sender FE yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes 
R-squared 0.32 0.41 
N 1,659,158 645,267 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: initiation of a human rights sanction case at the country-pair-year 
level. The variable “log trade” is a placeholder for log exports of sender to target (column 
(1)) and log imports of sender from target (column (2)). In column (1) the regression includes 
the variable “World import share of target, t-1“ and its interactions, in column (2) the 
regression includes the variable “World export share of target, t-1“ and its interactions. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at sender-year level. All 
regression include a full set of uninteracted variables from which the interaction terms are 
constructed and the following control variables: contiguity, common colonizer, number of 
members of GATT/WTO in the country pair, trade dispute within the country pair, election 
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TABLE 3. 10: UBIQUITY OF EXPORTERS/IMPORTERS AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS SANCTIONS 
 Exports Imports 
 (1) (2) 
   
Ubiquity of importers/exporters, t-1 # Log trade, sender to 
target, t-1 
0.0017 
(0.0016) 
-0.0006 
(0.0014) 
 
Energy # Ubiquity of importers/exporters, t-1 # Log trade, 
sender to target, t-1 
0.0033 
(0.0024) 
0.0023 
(0.0032) 
 
Non-ferrous metal # Ubiquity of importers/exporters, t-1  
# Log trade, sender to target, t-1 
-0.0029 
(0.0026) 
0.0064 
(0.0041) 
 
Chemicals # Ubiquity of importers/exporters, t-1  # Log 
trade, sender to target, t-1 
-0.0019 
(0.0023) 
-0.0203*** 
(0.0063) 
 
Electronics # Ubiquity of importers/exporters, t-1  # Log 
trade, sender to target, t-1 
0.0045** 
(0.0021) 
0.0017 
(0.0017) 
 
Nuclear # Ubiquity of importers/exporters, t-1  # Log 
trade, sender to target, t-1 
-0.0088 
(0.0059) 
0.0048 
(0.0234) 
 
Armaments # Ubiquity of importers/exporters, t-1  # Log 
trade, sender to target, t-1 
0.0015 
(0.0023) 
-0.0031 
(0.0043) 
 
Non-interacted main explanatory variables yes yes 
Control variables yes yes 
Sender FE yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes 
R-squared 0.32 0.42 
N 1,659,158 645,267 
 
 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: initiation of a human rights sanction case at the country-pair-year 
level. The variable “log trade” is a placeholder for log exports of sender to target (column 
(1)) and log imports of sender from target (column (2)). In column (1) the regression includes 
the variable “Ubiquity of importers, t-1“ and its interactions, in column (2) the regression 
includes the variable “Ubiquity of exporters, t-1“ and its interactions. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at sender-year level. All regression include a full 
set of uninteracted variables from which the interaction terms are constructed and the 
following control variables: contiguity, common colonizer, number of members of 
GATT/WTO in the country pair, trade dispute within the country pair, election year in 
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6.3 Rivalry 
A sanction may be shunned if strategic market share considerations are at play 
with respect to the role of the sanction-sending country in a given product 
market. Countries may be less incentivized to initiate a sanction when the target 
country is an important buyer or supplier of a product for which the sanctioning 
state competes fiercely, either as an exporter or as an importer. The degree of 
rivalry an exporter is exposed to in a market for a strategic good may be crucial 
for the decision to sanction. On the other hand, if a strategic good is strongly 
contested by many potential buyers as is the case with oil, then a potential 
sanction may not be initiated against the country which delivers the contested 
good. 
To measure rivalry in a product market, I employ a direct market-share instability 
measure borrowing from Sakakibara and Porter (2001).  This measure has its 
theoretical underpinnings in Stigler (1964) and Allen (1976) who observe that 
instability in market positions is a sign of active competition whereas stable 
market share may be indicative of oligopolistic collusion.  
Following Sakakibara and Porter (2001), I compute market-share instability from 
the sum of individual market-share fluctuations of each exporter and importer 
between t-6 and t-1. The measure for a country exporting a product k can be 
expressed as follows: 
 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,∆𝑃𝑃−5𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 = ∑ ∑ �𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃  −  𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1 �5𝑃𝑃=1𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖=1 5𝑡𝑡  
 
where 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃  are exports of a potential sanction sender i of product k in 
year t, 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 are the total world exports of product k in year t and n is the 
total number of exporters. The market-share instability measure for a country 
importing a product k is constructed in an analogous manner. 
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The following specifications test if market share instability has an impact on the 
probability of sanction: 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻_𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃)=  𝛽𝛽0 +  𝛽𝛽1𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽2𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,∆𝑃𝑃−5𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑃𝑃 +  𝛽𝛽4 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1 + 𝛽𝛽5 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,∆𝑃𝑃−5𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1 
∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,∆𝑃𝑃−5𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑃𝑃+ 𝛽𝛽7𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,∆𝑃𝑃−5𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑃𝑃 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑃𝑃−1)+  𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1 + 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃−1 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑃𝑃 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃  
          
     (3.5) 
The variable 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1  stands in for either 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1 or 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1 , 
i.e., for bilateral export and import flows at the product level and the variable 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,∆𝑃𝑃−5𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑃𝑃  stands in for either 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,∆𝑃𝑃−5𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒  or 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,∆𝑃𝑃−5𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒 . The results from 
estimations of the moderating effect of market-share instability on impact of 
strategic trade on the probability of human rights sanction are shown in Table 
3.11. Interestingly, neither export nor import share instability in strategic 
products has any impact on the decision to initiate a sanction case. Where export 
share instability counts is in the exports of non-strategic goods. The higher the 
market share instability an exporter faces in the markets for non-strategic goods, 
the lower the probability to initiate a sanction against those countries to which 
the exporter delivers those goods. 
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TABLE 3. 11: MARKET SHARE INSTABILITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
SANCTIONS 
 Exports Imports 
 (1) (2) 
   
Export/import share instability, sender, last 5 ys # Log 
trade, sender to target, t-1 
-0.1205** 
(0.0582) 
0.0031 
(0.0669) 
 
Energy # Export/import share instability, sender, last 5 ys 
# Log trade, sender to target, t-1 
0.0309 
(0.1117) 
-0.1197 
(0.4034) 
 
Non-ferrous metal # Export/import share instability, 
sender, last 5 ys # Log trade, sender to target, t-1 
0.0224 
(0.1507) 
-0.0654 
(0.3087) 
 
Chemicals # Export/import share instability, sender, last 5 
ys # Log trade, sender to target, t-1 
0.1966 
(0.1354) 
0.2436 
(0.2776) 
 
Electronics # Export/import share instability, sender, last 5 
ys # Log trade, sender to target, t-1 
0.0932 
(0.1267) 
0.4235 
(0.2702) 
 
Nuclear # Export/import share instability, sender, last 5 ys 
# Log trade, sender to target, t-1 
0.3628 
(0.2821) 
0.0050 
(0.1902) 
 
Armaments # Export/import share instability, sender, last 5 
ys # Log trade, sender to target, t-1 
0.1179 
(0.1444) 
-0.0515 
(0.3862) 
 
Non-interacted main explanatory variables yes yes 
Control variables yes yes 
Sender FE yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes 
R-squared 0.32 0.41 
N 1,659,158 645,267 
 
 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: initiation of a human rights sanction case at the country-pair-year 
level. The variable “log trade” is a placeholder for log exports of sender to target (column (1)) 
and log imports of sender from target (column (2)). In column (1) the regression includes the 
variable “Export share instability, sender, last 5 ys“ and its interactions, in column (2) the 
regression includes the variable “Import share instability, sender, last 5 ys“ and its interactions. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at sender-year level. All 
regression include a full set of uninteracted variables from which the interaction terms are 
constructed and the following control variables: contiguity, common colonizer, number of 
members of GATT/WTO in the country pair, trade dispute within the country pair, election 
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6.4         Non-economic factors 
Conditional on economic and political fundamentals I test if human rights-
concerned countries sanction less often countries that they are geopolitically 
aligned with. Human rights-concerned countries are interested in preventing a 
potential destabilization of countries with which they collaborate in international 
affairs or are of military importance. China’s imposition of (and follow-through 
with) human rights sanctions on North Korea may destabilize the authoritarian 
regime of its neighbor and lead to a civil conflict and North Korean migrant 
inflows to China, a situation China would like to prevent (Albert, 2017). On the 
other hand, delivery of strategic goods by human-rights concerned countries to 
human rights-abusing countries can also serve the strategy of strengthening ties 
between geopolitical allies. US arms deliveries to Saudi Arabia, an American-
friendly oil producer, allows the US a sustained access to oil, a product that has 
been tied to American national security (Jones, 2012). In sum, human rights-
promoting states have numerous incentives to abstain from sanctioning aligned 
countries since a sanction imposition may come with high economic, political 
and security costs. 
To measure whether countries that are geopolitically aligned with a sanctioning 
country have lower probability to be sanctioned, I use bilateral voting similarity 
in the UN General Assembly as a proxy for geopolitical alignment between two 
countries. This variable is defined as the share of votes in which the human 
rights-concerned country and the human rights abusing country vote identically, 
i.e., both voting yes, no or abstaining. This measure has been widely used to 
approximate bilateral geopolitical closeness (Barro and Lee, 2005; Dreher et. al., 
2008; Qian and Yanagizawa-Drott, 2009, Qian and Yanagizawa-Drott, 2017). 
Table 3.12 shows the results from a regression of the main specification (3.1) in 
which the key explanatory variables of interest have been interacted with UN 
voting similarity. The interactions of UN voting similarity with imports and 
exports of strategic and non-strategic goods are not statistically significant at 
conventional levels. Thus, there is no evidence that geopolitical ties between 
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sanction-sending and human rights-violating countries moderate the influence of 
strategic trade on the probability of a human rights sanction.  
 
TABLE 3. 12: GEOPOLITICAL MOTIVATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
SANCTIONS 
 Exports Imports 
 (1) (2) 
   
UN voting similarity, t-1 # Log trade, sender to target, t-1 -0.0003 
(0.0023) 
-0.0047 
(0.0032)  
Energy # UN voting similarity, t-1 # Log trade, sender to 
target, t-1 
-0.0002 
(0.0017) 
0.0059 
(0.0045) 
 
Non-ferrous metal # UN voting similarity, t-1 # Log trade, 
sender to target, t-1 
0.0012 
(0.0021) 
0.0033 
(0.0033) 
 
Chemicals # UN voting similarity, t-1 # Log trade, sender 
to target, t-1 
-0.0027 
(0.0032) 
-0.0004 
(0.0036) 
 
Electronics # UN voting similarity, t-1  # Log trade, sender 
to target, t-1 
-0.0012 
(0.0013) 
-0.0018 
(0.0013) 
 
Nuclear # UN voting similarity, t-1 # Log trade, sender to 
target, t-1 
-0.0012 
(0.0034) 
-0.0067 
(0.0066) 
 
Armaments # UN voting similarity, t-1 # Log trade, sender 
to target, t-1 
0.0014 
(0.0022) 
0.0037 
(0.0035) 
 
Non-interacted main explanatory variables yes yes 
Control variables yes yes 
Sender FE yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes 
R-squared 0.40 0.53 
N 1,659,158 645,267 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: initiation of a human rights sanction case at the country-pair-year 
level. The variable “log trade” is a placeholder for log exports of sender to target (column (1)) 
and log imports of sender from target (column (2)). Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard 
errors are clustered at sender-year level. All regression include a full set of uninteracted variables 
from which the interaction terms are constructed and the following control variables: contiguity, 
common colonizer, number of members of GATT/WTO in the country pair, trade dispute 
within the country pair, election year in sender country, democracy level in sender country, 
democracy level in target country, human rights abuse index in target country, political and 
ethnic murders in target country. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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7. Robustness checks 
In this section, I perform robustness checks of my results with respect to 
different modifications of the empirical strategy.  
 
7.1 Product composition of the trade relationship 
First, I control for the different magnitudes of trade flows between country pairs. 
Instead of using logged bilateral trade flows, I construct a measure of the relative 
composition of trade flows between two countries. This measure is a ratio of the 
bilateral trade flows in a given product over the total bilateral trade flows: 
 
𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1
𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1  
 
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃−1  
 
Rerunning specification (3.1) with the ratio measures instead of logged bilateral 
trade flows delivers qualitatively similar results. The higher the share of chemicals 
in the bilateral exports of a human rights-promoting country to a human rights-
violating country, the higher the probability to initiate a sanction (Table 3.13). A 
higher share of nuclear products relative to the total bilateral exports decreases 
the sanction probability. The more energy products a potential sanction sender 
imports from a potential target, relative to the total bilateral imports, the lower 
the likelihood for a human rights sanction. A negative effect on sanction 
probability is observed also for imports of chemicals, electronics, nuclear 
products and armaments. 
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TABLE 3. 13: PRODUCT COMPOSITION OF THE BILATERAL TRADE 
RELATIONSHIP 
 Exports Imports 
 (1) (2) 
   
Relative importance of a good within sender's exports 
to/imports from target, t-1  
0.0014 
(0.0117) 
0.0169*** 
(0.0062) 
 
Energy # Relative importance of a good within sender's 
exports to/imports from target, t-1 
0.0303 
(0.0232) 
-0.0383*** 
(0.0135) 
 
Non-ferrous metal # Relative importance of a good within 
sender's exports to/imports from target, t-1 
-0.0451 
(0.0293) 
0.0055 
(0.0224) 
 
Chemicals # Relative importance of a good within sender's 
exports to/imports from target, t-1 
0.1146** 
(0.0545) 
-0.0312* 
(0.0172) 
 
Electronics # Relative importance of a good within sender's 
exports to/imports from target, t-1 
0.0017 
(0.0252) 
-0.0501*** 
(0.0082) 
 
Nuclear # Relative importance of a good within sender's 
exports to/imports from target, t-1 
-0.3303*** 
(0.0686) 
-0.0382* 
(0.0224) 
 
Armaments # Relative importance of a good within sender's 
exports to/imports from target, t-1 
-0.0290 
(0.0224) 
-0.0556*** 
(0.0183) 
 
Non-interacted main explanatory variables yes yes 
Control variables yes yes 
Sender FE yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes 
R-squared 0.27 0.29 
N 1,659,158 645,267 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: initiation of a human rights sanction case at the country-pair-year 
level. In column (1) the regression includes the variable “Relative importance of a good 
within sender's exports to target, t-1“ and its interactions, in column (2) the regression 
includes the variable “Relative importance of a good within sender's imports from target, t-
1“ and its interactions. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at 
sender-year level. All regression include a full set of uninteracted variables from which the 
interaction terms are constructed and the following control variables: contiguity, common 
colonizer, number of members of GATT/WTO in the country pair, trade dispute within the 
country pair, election year in sender country, democracy level in sender country, democracy 
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7.2 Change of the relationship over time 
Next, I check whether my results are driven by a specific period in the sample 
such as the Cold War period or the post-Cold War era. In order to do this, I add 
interaction terms between the logged bilateral trade flows and decade dummies 
and present the results in Table 3.14. Exports of chemicals and electronics 
increase the sanction probability throughout the whole sample period. Exports 
of nuclear products and armaments have a negative impact on the probability of 
sanction and are statistically significant in all decades but the 1980s. Imports of 
energy products have a negative, statistically significant effect on the likelihood 
of a sanction initiation for all decades but the 1970s. Imports of non-ferrous 
metals and chemicals have a negative impact on sanction probability in the 1980s 
whereas nuclear products have a negative effect on sanction probability in the 
1990s. Thus, whereas the effect of exports on sanction probability does not seem 
to be driven by a particular time period, the effect of chemicals and non-ferrous 
metals imports is limited to the Cold War period, whereas the effect of nuclear 
imports is only evident after the end of the Cold War. 
 
TABLE 3. 14: STRATEGIC PRODUCTS BIAS IN HUMAN RIGHTS 
SANCTIONS, BY DECADE 
 Exports Imports 
 (1) (2) 
   
log trade, sender to target, t-1, 1970s 0.0008 -0.0007 
 (0.0006) (0.0004) 
Energy # log trade, sender to target, t-1, 1970s 0.0003 -0.0023 
 (0.0005) (0.0015) 
Non-ferrous metal # log trade, sender to target, t-1, 1970s 0.0002 -0.0015 
 (0.0005) (0.0012) 
Chemicals # log trade, sender to target, t-1, 1970s 0.0021*** 0.0010 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Electronics # log trade, sender to target, t-1, 1970s 0.0009*** -0.0003 
 (0.0003) (0.0005) 
Nuclear # log trade, sender to target, t-1, 1970s -0.0028** -0.0034 
 (0.0012) (0.0031) 
Armaments # log trade, sender to target, t-1, 1970s -0.0013** -0.0003 
 (0.0006) (0.0011) 
log trade, sender to target, t-1, 1980s 0.0019*** 0.0050*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0015) 
100                                                            Strategic goods trade bias in human rights sanctions 
 
Energy # log trade, sender to target, t-1, 1980s 0.0001 -0.0034*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0013) 
Non-ferrous metal # log trade, sender to target, t-1, 1980s 0.0007 -0.0021** 
 (0.0006) (0.0009) 
Chemicals # log trade, sender to target, t-1, 1980s 0.0018*** 0.0022*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0007) 
Electronics # log trade, sender to target, t-1, 1980s 0.0005* -0.0006 
 (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Nuclear # log trade, sender to target, t-1, 1980s -0.0012 -0.0022 
 (0.0012) (0.0018) 
Armaments # log trade, sender to target, t-1, 1980s -0.0010 -0.0005 
 (0.0007) (0.0012) 
log trade, sender to target, t-1, 1990s 0.0012 0.0015 
 (0.0008) (0.0010) 
Energy # log trade, sender to target, t-1, 1990s 0.0000 -0.0027** 
 (0.0004) (0.0012) 
Non-ferrous metal # log trade, sender to target, t-1, 1990s 0.0002 -0.0009 
 (0.0005) (0.0009) 
Chemicals # log trade, sender to target, t-1, 1990s 0.0016*** 0.0015* 
 (0.0006) (0.0008) 
Electronics # log trade, sender to target, t-1, 1990s 0.0006** -0.0005 
 (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Nuclear # log trade, sender to target, t-1, 1990s -0.0025** -0.0031** 
 (0.0011) (0.0015) 
Armaments # log trade, sender to target, t-1, 1990s -0.0013** -0.0008 
 (0.0006) (0.0011) 
log trade, sender to target, t-1, 2000s -0.0011 -0.0013*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0003) 
Energy # log trade, sender to target, t-1, 2000s -0.0002 -0.0020** 
 (0.0004) (0.0010) 
Non-ferrous metal # log trade, sender to target, t-1, 2000s -0.0006 -0.0014 
 (0.0004) (0.0011) 
Chemicals # log trade, sender to target, t-1, 2000s 0.0015** 0.0003 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Electronics # log trade, sender to target, t-1, 2000s 0.0009** -0.0001 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Nuclear # log trade, sender to target, t-1, 2000s -0.0034*** -0.0033 
 (0.0010) (0.0021) 
Armaments # log trade, sender to target, t-1, 2000s -0.0014** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0007 
(0.0010) 
   
Non-interacted main explanatory variables yes yes 
Control variables yes yes 
Sender FE yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes 
R-squared 0.32 0.43 
N 1,659,158 645,267 
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7.3 Sanctions imposition 
Next, I restrict the definition of a sanction case to sanctions imposition only. The 
results from rerunning specification (3.1) with the modified dependent variable 
are shown in Table 3.15. Whereas the coefficients for exports remain qualitatively 
similar to the benchmark specification, there are some differences in the results 
for imports as compared with the benchmark. Specifically, the probability for 
sanction imposition is negatively affected by imports of electronics and 
armaments. Neither energy imports nor chemicals and nuclear goods imports, 
which were significant determinants of the decision to initiate a sanction case 
play any role for the decision to impose a sanction. 
 
 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: initiation of a human rights sanction case at the country-pair-year 
level. The variable “log trade” is a placeholder for log exports (column (1)) and log imports 
(column (2)). Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at sender-year 
level. All regression include a full set of uninteracted variables from which the interaction 
terms are constructed and the following control variables: contiguity, common colonizer, 
number of members of GATT/WTO in the country pair, trade dispute within the country 
pair, election year in sender country, democracy level in sender country, democracy level in 
target country, human rights abuse index in target country, political and ethnic murders in 
target country. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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TABLE 3. 15: STRATEGIC PRODUCTS BIAS IN HUMAN RIGHTS 
SANCTIONS IMPOSITION 
 Exports Imports 
 (1) (2) 
   
log trade, sender to target, t-1 0.0003 
(0.0003) 
0.0007* 
(0.0004)  
Energy # log trade, sender to target, t-1 0.0003 
(0.0003) 
-0.0013 
(0.0008)  
Non-ferrous metal # log trade, sender to target, t-1 0.0001 
(0.0004) 
-0.0006 
(0.0006)  
Chemicals # log trade, sender to target, t-1 0.0010** 
(0.0005) 
0.0004 
(0.0006)  
Electronics # log trade, sender to target, t-1 0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0005** 
(0.0002)  
Nuclear # log trade, sender to target, t-1 -0.0017* 
(0.0009) 
-0.0017 
(0.0011)  
Armaments # log trade, sender to target, t-1 -0.0010** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0014* 
(0.0008)  
Non-interacted main explanatory variables yes yes 
Control variables yes yes 
Sender FE yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes 
R-squared 0.28 0.36 
N 1,659,158 645,267 
 
7.4 Sanction type 
Finally, I account for the different types of sanctions. Whereas the majority of 
the sanction cases provided for some kind of trade restriction – imports or 
exports restrictions, embargo, blockade or suspension of economic agreement – 
some featured only measures which may only indirectly affect trade. Among them 
are sanction types such as asset freezing, travel bans or termination of foreign 
aid. I exclude these non-trade-type sanctions and rerun specification (3.1). The 
Notes: Dependent variable: imposition of a human rights sanction at the country-pair-year 
level. The variable “log trade” is a placeholder for log exports of sender to target (column 
(1)) and log imports of sender from target (column (2)). Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Standard errors are clustered at sender-year level. All regression include a full set of 
uninteracted variables from which the interaction terms are constructed and the following 
control variables: contiguity, common colonizer, number of members of GATT/WTO in 
the country pair, trade dispute within the country pair, election year in sender country, 
democracy level in sender country, democracy level in target country, human rights abuse 
index in target country, political and ethnic murders in target country. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, 
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results in Table 3.16 show little change for exports. With the exception of nuclear 
product exports which are not statistically significant any more, all other strategic 
products keep their sign and statistical significance. On the imports side, energy 
products still have a negative impact on the decision to initiate a sanction, 
whereas chemicals and nuclear products do not contribute in a statistically 
significant way to this decision any more. However, non-ferrous metals become 
statistically significant and have a negative impact on sanction probability. 
 
TABLE 3. 16: TRADE SANCTIONS 
 Exports Imports 
 (1) (2) 
   
log trade, sender to target, t-1 0.0010*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0018*** 
(0.0006)  
Energy # log trade, sender to target, t-1 -0.0001 
(0.0003) 
-0.0027** 
(0.0011)  
Non-ferrous metal # log trade, sender to target, t-1 0.0008** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0023** 
(0.0009)  
Chemicals # log trade, sender to target, t-1 0.0017*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0011 
(0.0007)  
Electronics # log trade, sender to target, t-1 0.0005** 
(0.0002) 
0.0000 
(0.0003)  
Nuclear # log trade, sender to target, t-1 -0.0003 
(0.0008) 
-0.0021 
(0.0013)  
Armaments # log trade, sender to target, t-1 -0.0007* 
(0.0004) 
-0.0004 
(0.0010)  
Non-interacted main explanatory variables yes yes 
Control variables yes yes 
Sender FE yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes 
R-squared 0.19 0.37 
N 1,659,158 645,267 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: initiation of a human rights trade sanction case at the country-
pair-year level. The variable “log trade” is a placeholder for log exports of sender to target 
(column (1)) and log imports of sender from target (column (2)). Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at sender-year level. All regression include a full 
set of uninteracted variables from which the interaction terms are constructed and the 
following control variables: contiguity, common colonizer, number of members of 
GATT/WTO in the country pair, trade dispute within the country pair, election year in 
sender country, democracy level in sender country, democracy level in target country, 
human rights abuse index in target country, political and ethnic murders in target country. 
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8. Conclusion 
There has been a long-standing debate as to what extent economic relations 
between countries influence the decision to take measures against human-rights 
violating countries (Tomasevski, 1997; Alesina and Dollar, 2000, Neumayer, 
2003; Barratt, 2008; Nielsen, 2014). This paper contributes to this debate in the 
following way. I find that human rights-concerned countries impose sanction for 
human rights violations, but do so selectively. The countries that disregard 
human rights are sanctioned less often if they engage in trade in strategic goods, 
such as natural resources, armaments or high tech goods with the human rights-
concerned countries. Variations in the degree to which countries that violate 
human rights import or export strategic goods explain the differing treatment 
with sanctions that result from comparable human rights violations. 
The main channel that drives the differential treatment of countries trading in 
strategic goods are trade specialization patterns. In particular, I find that strategic 
trade has a stronger effect on the use of sanctions for sanction senders that are 
more dependent on the potential target or that find it harder to substitute the 
trade relationship with the potential target. The logic behind these findings is that 
not every trade flow disruption has the same opportunity costs – no matter 
whether it is in strategic or non-strategic goods. I also test for the moderating 
effect of close political ties between human rights-promoting and human rights-
violating countries but do not find any effect. 
My findings offer new insights on the existing body of contradictory findings 
linking trade to sanctions. If countries primarily sanction human rights abusers 
with which they trade in particular strategic commodities, the effects of trade on 
sanction initiation may be underestimated in the existing literature that only 
examined aggregated trade.  
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 Chapter 4: Sanctions effect persistence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
When a country imposes a sanction in the form of a bilateral trade restriction, 
does it harm its long-term relationship with the sanctioned country? Moreover, 
does the sanction target turn to other trade partners that seize the opportunity to 
expand their trade relations with the target? In 2016, Iran’s sanction regime was 
lifted. Did trade between Iran and the countries that had sanctioned it pick up 
swiftly? In 2018 the US threatened to reinstall its sanction regime. If the US 
follows up on its threat, will Iran intensify its trade relations with European non-
sanctioning countries? 
In this paper, I explore the effects of economic sanctions imposition. My focus 
is on trade outcomes, particularly bilateral trade between the sender and the target 
and between the target and non-sanctioning countries. The economic sanctions 
that I use are restrictions on trade of different duration – from 1 to 13 years. 
Using a country-pair panel of economic sanctions from 1965 to 2005, I estimate 
the effect of sanctions imposition on bilateral trade flows. I explore both trade 
dynamics during the sanction period, as well as the long-run effect on trade after 
the sanction is lifted. I find that trade flows between sanction sender and target 
drop substantially after the sanction starts. These effects are long-lived, and 
persist well after the sanction has ended. There is no negative effect of the sanction 
on target’s total trade. The sanctioned country is able to divert trade towards 
non-sanctioning competitors of the sanction sender.  
JEL-Codes: F51, F13, F14, D74, N40 
Keywords: sanctions, bilateral trade, persistence, trade diversion 
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They are imposed for various political and economic reasons, from arms 
proliferation and human rights violations to involvement in unfair trade practices. 
To assess the effects of these sanctions on bilateral trade, I conduct a synthetic 
control analysis.  
For each sanction case in my data, I construct a synthetic control sanction target 
from a donor pool of trade partners of the sanction sender that are similar to the 
country being sanctioned. I then evaluate the quality of each synthetic control by 
observing how well each one approximates the sanction target in the pre-sanction 
period. The synthetic controls that do not show a good fit are removed from the 
subsequent estimation. I aggregate all of the remaining, well-performing 
estimates to a single estimate for each group of sanction cases of equal duration.  
I find that sanctions depress bilateral trade flows for the time period the sanction 
is in place. Moreover, seven years after a sanction has been lifted, trade between 
sender and target has not reversed to pre-sanction levels. Examining the total 
trade flows of the target, I find no evidence for any impact of the sanction on 
sanctioned country’s total trade. I then investigate potential trade diversion by 
exploring the effects of the sanction on target’s trade with non-sanctioning 
countries. The target strengthens its trade relations during and after the sanction 
with countries that are geopolitically close to the sanction sender and not to the 
target. This opportunistic behavior of countries not involved in a sanction case 
is confirmed when testing for change in trade relations during and after sanction 
between the target and countries with export structure similar to the one of the 
sanction sender. I find that target’s trade is diverted towards competitors of the 
sanctioning country. 
The decline and the non-reversal of bilateral trade between sanction sender and 
target may point to the deterioration of “trading capital” as suggested by Head 
et. al. (2010), Beestermöller and Rauch (2018) and Gokmen et. al (2018). The 
sanction years can severely impair the political and economic relations between 
the sender and the target. The persistent underperformance of bilateral trade 
relative to the pre-sanction period even after the sanction has ended implies the 
destruction of trading capital and the accumulation of trading capital with 
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countries not involved in the sanction. To the best of my knowledge, the 
persistence of sanction effect on trade even after the end of the sanction has not 
been previously explored. My paper also adds to the literature that shows that 
recovery from trade interruption is a very long process (Felbermayr and Gröschl, 
2014; Nitsch and Wolf, 2013). 
Changes in the political relations between two countries can strongly influence 
trade relations. Interstate frictions negatively affect economic relations – 
differences in political and ideological affinity reduce trade (Mityakov et. al., 
2013) as do separate acts of political animosity between countries (Michaels and 
Zhi, 2010; Fuchs and Klann, 2013; Fisman, et. al. 2014; Heilmann, 2016). These 
studies focus either on a single market or on the bilateral trade of a single country. 
I measure the effect of foreign policy conflict-induced trade restrictions on 
bilateral and third-party trade for a sample of 22 sanction senders and 44 sanction 
targets for a total of 150 sanction cases from 1965 to 2005. 
Much of the research contributions on the relationship between sanctions and 
trade come from political science. Several studies explore the impact of sanctions 
on trade (Evenett, 2002; Hufbauer et al., 2009) whereas another strand of 
literature examines the effect of third-party trade with the target for the success 
of US sanctions (Caruso, 2003; Kaempfer and Ross, 2004; Yang et. al., 2004; 
Early, 2009). The focus of these studies is the success of the sanctions in 
achieving their desired objectives, whereas I explore the trade-depressing and 
trade-diverting effects of sanctions. Moreover, these studies use cross-sectional 
or panel approaches that suffer from unobserved confounding factors. By 
employing the synthetic control method, I construct data-driven counterfactuals 
and thus overcome the omitted variables bias. 
My paper also adds to the trade diversion literature. While the majority of the 
contributions focus on the trade-creating and trade-diverting effects of 
preferential trade agreements, my study relates most closely to those papers that 
examine trade diversion in response to antidumping measures (Prusa, 1997, 2001; 
Bown and Crowley 2006, 2007, 2010; Shen and Fu, 2014). Antidumping duties 
decrease trade with countries affected by the duty and increase trade of the 
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antidumping target with third parties. Considering trade sanction as a tax on 
trade, I examine trade diversion during and after sanctions. Who do target 
countries turn to trade with? Contrary to the findings of the political economy 
literature that political regime proximity increases trade (Morrow et. al., 1998; 
Mansfield et. al. 2000; Long and Leeds, 2006; Aidt and Gassebner, 2010), I find 
that sanction targets do not increase trade with their geopolitical allies but turn 
to trade with those allies of the sanction sender that have a similar export 
structure as the sender. 
While a large number of papers have employed the synthetic control approach 
on individual case studies since its inception with the study by Abadie et. al. 
(2003), there exists a small but growing literature that applies synthetic control 
analysis on multiple treatments. Several studies explore the health and labor 
market outcomes of different policy changes for multiple treated units (Dube and 
Zipperer, 2015; Donohue et. al., 2017; Hall et. al., 2017; Lepine et. al., 2017), 
whereas Acemoglu et. al. (2016) assess the performance of politically connected 
firms. Methodically closest to my study are the contributions by Saia (2017) who 
explores the hypothetical change in trade flows had the UK joined the Eurozone, 
and Hall et. al. (2017) and Cavallo et. al. (2013) who deal with multiple recurring 
events. 
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 presents 
theoretical considerations. Section 3 describes the synthetic control method and 
the data. Section 4 presents the main result of the synthetic control estimation of 
sanction on trade. Section 5 explores the trade diversion effects for the target, 
following the sanction. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical considerations 
What happens when a sanction in the form of trade restriction is introduced? 
Borrowing from Bown and Crowley (2007), in a world with three countries – 
sender (S), target (T) and non-sender (NS) – where trade is free, let S impose a 
sanction on imports from T. Conceptually, this can be thought of as an 
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imposition of a prohibitively high import tariff. How does that affect trade flows 
among the three countries? Assume a simplified setting where each country has 
one firm producing a single good and firms compete in quantities. Each good is 
produced with the same technology and the goods are substitutes.  The marginal 
cost of production is increasing for each firm. Firms sell their good at home and 
in the two foreign markets. Each firm chooses a total output level and how much 
it well sell at home and abroad so that is maximizes its profits. In a free trade 
world, the firm’s best response to the other firms’ sales decisions is to allocate its 
sales across the three markets so that its net marginal revenue is the same in every 
market (a Cournot Nash equilibrium).  
With three countries, three firms with increasing marginal costs in production 
and goods that are substitutes, an imposition of a sanction changes the free trade 
equilibrium in the following way: (1) Target T’s exports to the sender S decrease, 
(2) Target T’s exports to non-sender NS increase. These results depend on the 
assumption of increasing marginal costs of production. In particular, the trade 
diversion comes about because of the higher costs (due to the sanction 
imposition) of selling to the sender (S). In equilibrium, the net marginal revenues 
should be equal across the three markets, if they are not, then firms will divert 
their sales away from the market with the higher costs of selling to the other 
markets.  
I now turn to empirically test the theoretical predictions. 
 
3. Synthetic control method 
I estimate the impact of sanctions on trade with the synthetic control method 
(Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie et al. 2010, 2015). This approach has the 
advantage of overcoming the problem of omitted variable bias and consistently 
defining a control group. The synthetic control method follows a data-driven 
approach in the selection of the control pool – it takes the weighted average of 
all available control units, whereby the weights are chosen to ensure that the 
synthetic control group resembles the treated units in the outcome variable and 
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in all explanatory variables in the pre-treatment period. This matching on prior 
outcomes allows to indirectly control for any unobserved characteristics. The 
treatment effect is calculated as the difference between the treatment and 
synthetic control unit in the post-treatment period. 
I first define the number of treatment events. I consider the entire period for 
which sanction data is available – 1948-2005. Throughout this period there are 
1092 sanction cases recorded. I focus on those sanctions that impose any type of 
trade restriction – export or import restriction, embargo or blockade – and 
exclude sanction cases that impose other types of restrictions, such as termination 
of foreign aid, asset freeze or travel ban. I am then left with 498 sanction cases. 
Some sanction senders sanction the same target several times. Hence, I restrict 
my sample in the following way. I select those sanction cases for which there was 
no sanction in the country-pair 15 years prior to the start of the sanction case and 
7 years after the sanction case ended. Each sanction case then consists of a 
bilaterally sanction-free 15-year pre-sanction window, a sanction window equal 
to the sanction duration and a bilaterally sanction-free 7 year post-sanction 
window. These limitations decrease the pool of treatment events to 150 sanction 
cases (Table A4.1). 
There is a trade-off between the number of sanction cases and the window length 
for each case. Shortening the pre- and post-treatment periods increases the 
number of sanction cases that I can include but decreases the estimation quality 
as less pre-treatment data is used to construct the synthetic control estimator. In 
contrast, increasing the pre- and post-treatment periods decreases the number of 
sanction cases included and may also reduce the credibility of the estimates. My 
main estimation uses a pre-treatment period of 15 years but estimations with 10 
and 20 years of pre-treatment delivered qualitatively similar results. 
In terms of predictive variables, I use a set of three theoretically motivated 
variables – log of GDP of the sanction target, log of distance between the sender 
and the target and previous bilateral export and import levels. The synthetic 
control method weights these pre-treatment characteristics such that the mean-
squared prediction error of the pre-sanction trade flows (the outcome variable) 
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is minimized. Specifically, the method ensures that the average of the squared 
differences between the target’s bilateral trade flows with the sanction sender and 
the synthetic control unit’s bilateral trade flows with the sender during the 15-
year pre-sanction period is minimized.   
For each sanction target in my sample, I select similar countries to construct the 
donor pool. It is important to restrict the donor pool to only those units that are 
similar to the treatment units in order to avoid overfitting (Abadie et. al., 2015). 
I construct a measure of similarity for target countries in the following way. First, 
I calculate the average dollar value difference in bilateral exports and imports 
with the sanction sender over the pre-treatment period between the target 
country and every other country in the world. Second, I construct the by-year 
correlation of the bilateral exports and imports with the sender between the target 
and every other country in the world. With these two steps I make sure that two 
countries are similar not only in terms of bilateral trade levels with the sender but 
also in terms of how their bilateral trade flows with the sender evolve over time. 
Finally, I normalize the two measures and average them into a single measure of 
export or import similarity. I then select the top 20 most similar countries for 
each target country and assign them to the donor pool11.12    
Given that the pre-treatment period is long enough, the convex combination of 
counterfactual units will replicate any observed or unobservable determinants of 
bilateral trade flows for each country pair. If the synthetic control unit 
approximates the treated unit well enough in the pre-treatment period, then any 
subsequent difference between treated and control units will represent the effect 
of the sanction on bilateral trade flows.  
I use the following data for the synthetic control analysis. Information on 
sanctions comes from the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions dataset, 
                                                          
11 Estimation results remain qualitatively similar when I choose the top 50 or the top 10 
countries to be part of the donor pool. 
12 A different approach to ensure comparability of the donor pool to the treatment units is to 
restrict the pool according to similarity of the predictor variables in the pre-treatment period. 
To that end, I restrict the donor pool to countries that differ by not more than +/-100% in 
terms of GDP of the treated target and +/-100% in terms of distance of the treated target to 
the sender. Estimation results remain comparable to my main result.      
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by Morgan, Bapat and Kobayashi (2014). The data has been collected via human 
search in Lexis-Nexis, Facts on File, Keesing’s Record of World Events, the New 
York Times index, and the London Times index. Sanctions are defined as actions 
a country undertakes to reduce or cut its economic ties with a target country, 
aiming thereby to change the target country’s behavior or policies. The dataset 
covers 1092 sanction cases from 1945 to 2005 and is considered the most 
comprehensive source on sanctions occurrence available.  
Data on bilateral trade flows comes from International Monetary Fund's 
Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS). Lastly, data on current GDP is provided 
by the World Bank (World Development Indicators, WDI), whereas data on 
bilateral distance comes from the CEPII database. The sources of any additional 
data used in the paper are presented as I go along.  
 
4. Synthetic control estimates of sanction effects on trade 
I estimate the effect of a sanction on trade for every sanction case for which it 
was possible to construct a synthetic control. Going through the estimates one 
by one reveals that some of them are rather poor – for some sanction cases there 
are considerable gaps between the target country and the synthetic control group 
and hence the pre-treatment fit is bad. These cases also feature a high root mean 
square prediction error (RMSPE) for the pre-intervention period. I use this 
measure of the goodness of fit in the pre-period to take out poor synthetic 
control estimates. 
I estimate the average effects on trade for all sanction cases and then choose 
RMSPE cutoffs of 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 and compute the average effects on trade for the 
remaining sanction cases. The results for the preferred cutoff of 0.6 are plotted 
in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, for exports and imports, respectively. The estimates for 
the other cutoffs as well as the estimates with all sanction cases are presented in 
the Appendix, Figures A4.1-A4.6. A comparison of the plots with different 
cutoffs underscores the need to screen out poorly fitting synthetic controls. 
When including all cases (i.e., the no-cutoff estimates), the pre-treatment fit of 
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several sanction groups is particularly bad – 1-year, 2-year, 7-year and 9-year 
sanction cases feature either an extreme pre-intervention trend or a pre-
intervention bias (Figures A4.5 and A4.6). Even if there is any effect of sanctions 
on trade, it is swamped by the pre-treatment bias. Limiting the calculation of the 
average effect to those sanction cases under a given threshold for the pre-
sanction RMSPE moves the pre-treatment trend closer to zero.  
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Notes: These figures plot the difference between sanctioned countries and a synthetic control 
country consisting of similar countries that did not contemporaneously experience a 
sanction. Sanction cases are grouped according to sanction length. Only sanction cases with 
pre-treatment RMSPE < 0.6 are included. Pre-intervention matching until year -4. The first 
red vertical line denotes the initiation of a sanction, the second one – the end of a sanction. 
FIGURE 4. 1: TREND OF AVERAGE LOG EXPORTS GAP WITH THE 
SYNTHETIC CONTROL METHOD 
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FIGURE 4. 1 (CONTINUED): TREND OF AVERAGE LOG EXPORTS 
GAP WITH THE SYNTHETIC CONTROL METHOD 
Notes: Figure continued from previous page. 
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Notes: These figures plot the difference between sanctioned countries and a synthetic control 
country consisting of similar countries that did not contemporaneously experience a 
sanction. Sanction cases are grouped according to sanction length. Only sanction cases with 
pre-treatment RMSPE < 0.6 are included. Pre-intervention matching until year -4. The first 
red vertical line denotes the initiation of a sanction, the second one – the end of a sanction. 
FIGURE 4. 2: TREND OF AVERAGE LOG IMPORTS GAP WITH THE 
SYNTHETIC CONTROL METHOD 
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Notes: Figure continued from previous page. 
FIGURE 4. 2 (CONTINUED): TREND OF AVERAGE LOG IMPORTS 
GAP WITH THE SYNTHETIC CONTROL METHOD 
124                                                                               Sanctions effect persistence 
 
There is a tradeoff in limiting the sanction cases according to their pre-treatment 
RMSPE – while the pre-treatment fit improves, the sample size is reduced. For 
example, whereas the full sample features 150 sanction cases, with a RMSPE 
cutoff of 0.4 we are left with a total of 96 sanction cases and some empty sanction 
groups (there are no 9-year sanctions left). I choose a cutoff of 0.6 which leaves 
me with 125 sanction cases and simultaneously remediates the strong pre-
treatment trends and bias. Qualitatively, the results are reassuringly similar with 
the other cutoffs or when including all sanction cases. 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the by-year estimated treatment effects for exports and 
imports using the preferred screening method. The 11 panels in each figure 
correspond to 11 groups of sanctions of differing duration – 1 to 10 and 13 years 
long sanction cases. The thick black line in each panel represents the average 
trade gap between the treated countries and the synthetic control countries in the 
15 pre-treatment, 1 to 13 treatment and 7 post-treatment years.  Both estimates 
for imports and exports depict a common picture of the impact of sanctions on 
bilateral trade flows between a sanction sender and the target. There is a 
substantial persistent negative effect of sanctions on trade flows, which settles in 
shortly before a sanction is imposed, continues throughout the sanction duration 
and remains even after the sanction has been lifted. This effect is observed among 
the sanction groups of 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 13 years of duration. The 
magnitude of the negative impact on trade flows increases with the increasing 
duration of the sanction. For 3-, 4-, 7-, 8-, 9-, and 10-year sanctions, trade flows 
do not seem to revert to their pre-sanction level even seven years after the 
sanction was lifted. After a sanction of 1, 5 or 13 years, a reversal to pre-sanction 
trade is observed only around three years after the end of the sanction. The few 
cases for which the average effect is not as strongly negative are sanction of 2 
and 6 years and 2, 6, and 9 years of duration, for exports and imports, 
respectively. These results suggest that in the majority of cases sanctions 
generated a trade disruption and a persistent effect on the level of trade between 
the sender and the target. 
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5. Sanction’s effect on target’s trade 
5.1 Effect on total trade 
A sanction may have depressed a target’s total trade or it may have diverted trade 
to other trade partners of the target. In the following, I provide an estimate of a 
sanction’s effect on the total trade flows of a target. 
In the previous section, I showed that trade flows between the target and the 
sender are lower during and after sanction. Thus, the explicit goal of the sanction 
to deprive a target of bilateral trade flows is fulfilled. However, if the target is 
able to divert its trade flows to other non-sanctioning countries, then the impact 
of the sanction would be moderated, or even fully counterbalanced. In this 
section, I explore whether the trade flows between the target and all of its trading 
partners are reduced during and after sanction.  
If the aggregate exports or imports of the target decrease, then a sanction has 
caused trade destruction for the target. Otherwise, if trade does not change or if 
it increases during and after sanction, with contemporaneous trade decrease with 
the sender, then this is an indicator for trade diversion.  
To test for the effect of a sanction on the total trade of the target I use a gravity-
style approach and estimate a during- and post-sanction period dummy for all 
countries according to equation (4.1), controlling for GDP, population, country 
and time fixed effects. I run the regression for exports and imports separately 
and report results in Table 4.1. 
 
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽3 log𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽4 log𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 + 𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃 +
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃     
(4.1) 
 
Estimates for both total exports and imports  (columns (1) and (2)) show that 
the effects of the ongoing sanction as well as a seven-year post-sanction period 
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on total trade flows are not statistically different from zero. This remains true 
when looking at each year separately (columns (3) and (4)), where except for 
sanction years 11, 12, and 13 which have a positive effect on aggregate trade all 
the other coefficients are not statistically significant. This suggests that the 
decreased share of trade of the target with the sanction sender was compensated 
with a shift of imports and exports towards other countries. I next confirm this 
finding in a bilateral regression analysis in section 5.2 where I explicitly show the 
trade partners with which the target intensifies its trade relations. 
 
TABLE 4. 1: THE EFFECTS OF A SANCTION ON TARGET'S TOTAL 
TRADE FLOWS 
 ln exports ln imports ln exports ln imports 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
during sanction -0.0001 -0.0005   
 (0.0009) (0.0012)   
after sanction -0.0002 -0.0019   
 (0.0022) (0.0012)   
during sanction: t=1   -0.0002 -0.0013 
   (0.0019) (0.0014) 
during sanction: t=2   -0.0004 -0.0021 
   (0.0020) (0.0019) 
during sanction: t=3   -0.0001 -0.0006 
   (0.0009) (0.0016) 
during sanction: t=4   -0.0002 0.0001 
   (0.0011) (0.0015) 
during sanction: t=5   -0.0002 0.0006 
   (0.0006) (0.0009) 
during sanction: t=6   -0.0001 0.0003 
   (0.0006) (0.0008) 
during sanction: t=7   0.0007 0.0011 
   (0.0006) (0.0007) 
during sanction: t=8   0.0005 0.0011 
   (0.0007) (0.0010) 
during sanction: t=9   -0.0000 -0.0004 
   (0.0010) (0.0008) 
during sanction: t=10   0.0007 -0.0001 
   (0.0012) (0.0009) 
during sanction: t=11   0.0016*** 0.0001 
   (0.0005) (0.0004) 
during sanction: t=12   0.0014*** 0.0007** 
   (0.0004) (0.0003) 
during sanction: t=13   0.0011** 0.0007** 
   (0.0004) (0.0003) 
after sanction: t=1   -0.0000 -0.0021 
   (0.0022) (0.0014) 
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after sanction: t=2   0.0001 -0.0023 
   (0.0024) (0.0015) 
after sanction: t=3   -0.0003 -0.0025* 
   (0.0026) (0.0014) 
after sanction: t=4   -0.0003 -0.0022 
   (0.0024) (0.0014) 
after sanction: t=5   -0.0002 -0.0019 
   (0.0024) (0.0013) 
after sanction: t=6   0.0001 -0.0015 
   (0.0025) (0.0015) 
after sanction: t=7   -0.0000 -0.0017 
   (0.0025) (0.0013) 
Control variables yes yes yes yes 
Country FE yes yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes yes 
N 10,256 10,256 10,256 10,256 
R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
 
 
 
5.2 Trade with non-senders 
In section 4 we observed that a sanction reduces bilateral trade between sender 
and target. Then, in section 5.1 we saw that the total trade of the target does not 
decrease. What happens to bilateral trade of the target with other countries that 
are not contemporaneously imposing a sanction?  
In order to estimate the effects of sanctions on bilateral trade I need a benchmark 
for the trade that is expected if the sanction had not been imposed. A common 
practice in the empirical trade literature is to model expected bilateral trade with 
a specification derived from the gravity equation, which I am going to adopt here 
for my purposes. 
My specification examines the effect of an imposed sanction on the bilateral 
exports and imports to and from non-sanctioning trading partners: 
 
 
Notes: The unit of observation is a country i in year t, where t ranges from 1948 to 2015. The 
dependent variable in columns 1 and 3 is the natural log of imports from world; in columns 2 
and 4 – natural log of exports from world. Control variables include log population and log 
GDP. Standard errors are clustered at the country level.  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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ln𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 = 𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒_𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝛾𝛾 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃  
(4.2) 
where 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 stands in for exports and imports, i indicates a potential sanction 
target country, j indicates a potential sanction sender country and t indicates year. 
To measure the effect of years during and after sanction on trade with the rest of 
the countries not contemporaneously involved in sanctions against the target I 
include dummies – 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒_𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 and 𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 – for 
target’s trade with non-senders during sanction and seven years after a sanction 
is lifted. For illustration, consider the export and import restriction against 
Argentina imposed by USA, Great Britain and Germany in 1982 and lifted in 
1989. The non-sender dummies during sanction or up to seven years after this 
sanction case turn on for the years 1982-1989 and 1990-1996, respectively, for 
every non-sanction-participating trade partner of Argentina during these periods. 
The 𝛽𝛽1 and 𝛽𝛽2 coefficients provide estimates of the effect of an imposed sanction 
on bilateral exports or imports of the sanctioned country with its non-sanctioning 
partners, during and after the sanction. A positive coefficient would imply that, 
on average, trade flows with non-sender countries increased relative to trade 
flows with sanction-sending countries. 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 represents time-varying exporter-, importer or country-pair variables. These 
include indicators for membership in the GATT, common free trade agreement 
and common currency (from the CEPII database) and the logs of GDP and 
population for country i and j (World Development Indicators from the World 
Bank). 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are pair fixed effects used to account for the omitted variable bias 
stemming from omitted multilateral resistance terms (Anderson and van 
Wincoop, 2003). How much two countries would trade with each other depends 
on the barriers to trade between the two countries relative to the barriers between 
each country and the rest of the world. The excluded multilateral resistance terms 
depend on these bilateral trade barriers and vary over time. Thus, the country-
pair fixed effects control for the bias stemming from the omission of the 
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multilateral resistance. These country-pair dummies allow for an estimation that 
relies on time-series variation in trade flows around country-pair averages and 
disposes of the cross-sectional variation between country pairs. As a result, I 
control for time-invariant differences between exporters or importers that may 
lead to the intensification or slow-down of trade during or immediately after a 
sanction period. 
The year fixed effects 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃 control for shocks common to all countries or trends 
that may confound the estimates – inflation trends, or oil shocks changing 
transport costs. Lastly, I cluster the standard errors 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 at the country-pair level 
in order to allow for correlation between observations within the same pair. 
I now turn to the results of my OLS estimation with country-pair fixed effects, 
which are reported in Table 4.2. Columns (1) and (2) show that sanctioned 
countries export disproportionately more to non-sanctioning countries during 
and after a sanction. This is also true for imports of sanction targets from non-
senders, after a sanction is lifted. The estimated coefficients on exports during 
(0.054) and after (0.105) sanction imply that a target’s exports to non-sanctioning 
countries is 5.4 percent greater than in no-sanction years and 10.5 percent greater 
than in years not immediately following the end of a sanction. For imports, the 
estimate is indicating 9.5 percent higher imports from non-senders relative to 
years that are not closely following the end of a sanction. 
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TABLE 4. 2: TARGET’S TRADE WITH NON-SENDERS DURING AND 
AFTER SANCTION 
 ln exports ln imports ln exports ln imports 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ongoing sanction for i where j is not 
the sender 
0.0541*** 
(0.0155) 
0.0039 
(0.0180) 
  
   
7-year post-sanction period for i 
where j was not the sender 
0.1050*** 
(0.0126) 
0.0951*** 
(0.0158) 
  
   
during sanction: t=1   0.0743*** 0.0264 
   (0.0163) (0.0212) 
during sanction: t=2   0.0839*** 0.05050** 
   (0.0182) (0.0231) 
during sanction: t=3   0.0882*** 0.0176 
   (0.0232) (0.0266) 
during sanction: t=4   0.0724*** -0.0568* 
   (0.0278) (0.0303) 
during sanction: t=5   0.1150*** 0.0112 
   (0.0343) (0.0360) 
during sanction: t=6   0.0717** 0.0016 
   (0.0348) (0.0402) 
during sanction: t=7   -0.0311 -0.1580*** 
   (0.0595) (0.0556) 
during sanction: t=8   0.1540** 0.0018 
   (0.0605) (0.0646) 
during sanction: t=9   0.1620** 0.1870** 
   (0.0747) (0.0809) 
during sanction: t=10   -0.0276 0.1430* 
   (0.0810) (0.0851) 
during sanction: t=11   -0.7290*** 0.2700* 
   (0.169) (0.1570) 
during sanction: t=12   -0.4290*** -0.0636 
   (0.152) (0.1110) 
during sanction: t=13   -0.4050*** -0.2080 
   (0.1510) (0.1490) 
after sanction: t=1   0.0829*** 0.0420* 
   (0.0168) (0.0220) 
after sanction: t=2   0.1220*** 0.0596*** 
   (0.0169) (0.0221) 
after sanction: t=3   0.1310*** 0.1180*** 
   (0.0168) (0.0218) 
after sanction: t=4   0.0907*** 0.1100*** 
   (0.0170) (0.0212) 
after sanction: t=5   0.0797*** 0.1010*** 
   (0.0168) (0.0218) 
after sanction: t=6   0.1150*** 0.1040*** 
   (0.0168) (0.0206) 
after sanction: t=7   0.1110*** 0.1330*** 
   (0.0162) (0.0206) 
Control variables yes yes yes yes 
Country-pair FE yes yes yes yes 
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Year FE yes yes yes yes 
N 788,053 729,759 788,053 729,759 
R-squared 0.336 0.354 0.336 0.355 
 
 
 
 
To gain a better understanding of the evolution of the target-non-senders trade 
over time, I decompose the dummies 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒_𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 and 
𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 into indicator variables for each year during a sanction is 
in place and for the seven years after the sanction is lifted. The estimates for the 
newly created 13 dummies for trade during sanction and 7 dummies for trade 
post-sanction are reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 4.2. From column (3) 
it stands out that exports to non-sanctioning countries are relatively higher than 
in years without a sanction, up until sanction year 9. Sanction year 10 is a turning 
point for a target’s exports to non-senders. The year dummies become non-
significant and then strongly and statistically significant negative for sanction 
years 11-13. This means that for the few quite long sanction cases, targets export 
less to non-senders than during non-sanction years. This may be due to the fact 
that for longer sanctions the sanction sender is over time able to persuade other 
countries to shun from trade with the target or it may signal the economic cost 
of a prolonged sanction which may negatively affect the competitiveness and the 
exports of a target over time. For imports (column (4)) the results are somewhat 
less stable, with most of the during-sanction-dummies insignificant, except for a 
positive impact for sanction years 2, 9, and 11 and a negative impact for sanction 
years 4 and 7. For the seven post-sanction years targets export and import more 
with non-senders than they do in other years not immediately following the end 
of a sanction. These results provide evidence for increased trade of sanction 
targets with non-sanctioning countries, during and after a sanction. In other 
words, countries under sanction, on average, redirect trade to the rest of the 
world. In the next section, I will explore which trade relations of the target 
intensify during and after sanctions. 
Notes: The unit of observation is a country-pair in year t, where t ranges from 1948 to 2015. The 
dependent variable in columns (1) and (3) is the natural log of exports of country i to country j  
in year t,  in columns (2) and (4) – natural log of imports of country i to country j in year t. 
Control variables include log population for i and j, log GDP for i and j, indicator for both 
countries in GATT/WTO, indicator for regional trade agreement, indicator for common 
currency. Standard errors are clustered at the country-pair level.  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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To what extent are these implications of intensified trade relations with non-
senders borne out among the different types of sanctions? Among the sanction 
cases in the sample there are two general types of sanctions – political ones, i.e., 
those initiated because of territorial dispute or military behavior of the target, aim 
of the sender to destabilize or politically influence the target or improve human 
rights conditions in the target, and the goal of the sender to prevent the target 
from acquiring weapons or strategic materials; and trade sanctions, i.e., those 
initiated because of particular trade practices of the target, such as protectionist 
measures, tariffs or other trade restrictions. While in the case of political 
sanctions the sanction sender may not be sufficiently economically engaged with 
the target and thus, may not value highly any loss of bilateral trade flows, for 
trade practices sanctions the particular reason for the sanction imposition is a 
trade-related one and a trade diversion by the target may be an unwanted side 
effect of the sanction for the sender. 
In tables 4.3 and 4.4 I provide results after splitting the sample in political and 
trade sanctions. Both exports and imports of the target with non-sanctioning 
countries are negatively affected during an ongoing sanction whereas there is no 
effect after the sanction is removed (Table 4.3). On the other hand, trade 
sanctions drive up the target’s exports and imports with countries not involved 
in the sanction. These intensified trade relations continue also after the sanction 
case ends (Table 4.4). As expected, politically motivated sanctions often pertain 
to issues related to widely held international norms and thus under international 
political pressure more countries may shun from trade with the target (Bapat and 
Morgan, 2009). In contrast, trade practices sanctions are often provoked by 
domestic economic concerns of the sanction sender and thus have a more 
bilateral character (Drury et. al., 2014). 
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TABLE 4. 3. TARGET’S TRADE WITH NON-SENDERS DURING AND 
AFTER POLITICAL SANCTION 
 ln exports ln imports ln exports ln imports 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ongoing political sanction for i 
where j is not the sender 
-0.0549** 
(0.0235) 
-0.0625** 
(0.0263) 
  
7-year post-political sanction 
period for i where j was not the 
sender 
-0.0190 
(0.0175) 
0.0002 
(0.0216) 
  
during sanction: t=1   -0.0544** -0.0689** 
   (0.0255) (0.0310) 
during sanction: t=2   -0.0448 -0.0151 
   (0.0288) (0.0330) 
during sanction: t=3   -0.0992*** -0.1129*** 
   (0.0363) (0.0413) 
during sanction: t=4   -0.0329 -0.1559*** 
   (0.0393) (0.0454) 
during sanction: t=5   0.0205 0.0009 
   (0.0409) (0.0460) 
during sanction: t=6   -0.0004 -0.0665 
   (0.0402) (0.0521) 
during sanction: t=7   -0.0889 -0.1289 
   (0.0708) (0.0805) 
during sanction: t=8   -0.0770 -0.0326 
   (0.0753) (0.1062) 
during sanction: t=9   0.0286 0.0690 
   (0.0922) (0.1083) 
during sanction: t=10   -0.1201 0.0728 
   (0.0932) (0.1045) 
during sanction: t=11   -0.7602*** 0.2494 
   (0.1692) (0.1577) 
during sanction: t=12   -0.4622*** -0.0840 
   (0.1522) (0.1122) 
during sanction: t=13   -0.4401*** -0.2293 
   (0.1514) (0.1502) 
after sanction: t=1   -0.0727*** -0.0472 
   (0.0255) (0.0309) 
after sanction: t=2   -0.0024 -0.0230 
   (0.0250) (0.0302) 
after sanction: t=3   -0.0337 0.0311 
   (0.0250) (0.0306) 
after sanction: t=4   -0.0410* 0.0335 
   (0.0242) (0.0299) 
after sanction: t=5   -0.0462* 0.0285 
   (0.0238) (0.0295) 
after sanction: t=6   0.0058 0.00159 
   (0.0243) (0.0290) 
after sanction: t=7   -0.0048 0.0280 
   (0.0234) (0.0287) 
Control variables yes yes yes yes 
Country-pair FE yes yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes yes 
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N 788,053 729,759 788,053 729,759 
R-squared 0.336 0.354 0.336 0.354 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4. 4: TARGET’S TRADE WITH NON-SENDERS DURING AND 
AFTER TRADE SANCTION 
 ln exports ln imports ln exports ln imports 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ongoing trade sanction for i 
where j is not the sender 
0.1715*** 
(0.0189) 
0.0600** 
(0.0248) 
  
7-year post-trade sanction period 
for i where j was not the sender 
0.2074*** 
(0.0155) 
0.1594*** 
(0.0212) 
  
during sanction: t=1   0.1512*** 0.0837*** 
   (0.0184) (0.0268) 
during sanction: t=2   0.1675*** 0.0947*** 
   (0.0203) (0.0299) 
during sanction: t=3   0.2365*** 0.0846** 
   (0.0264) (0.0353) 
during sanction: t=4   0.1596*** -0.0229 
   (0.0371) (0.0417) 
during sanction: t=5   0.2216*** -0.0086 
   (0.0633) (0.0570) 
during sanction: t=6   0.1362** 0.0635 
   (0.0685) (0.0620) 
during sanction: t=7   0.0076 -0.2002*** 
   (0.1106) (0.0767) 
during sanction: t=8   0.4458*** 0.0241 
   (0.0979) (0.0813) 
during sanction: t=9   0.3678*** 0.3346*** 
   (0.1259) (0.1240) 
during sanction: t=10   0.1605 0.2725* 
   (0.1597) (0.1396) 
after sanction: t=1   0.1832*** 0.0953*** 
   (0.0189) (0.0279) 
after sanction: t=2   0.2003*** 0.1127*** 
   (0.0192) (0.0283) 
after sanction: t=3   0.2484*** 0.1709*** 
   (0.0187) (0.0277) 
after sanction: t=4   0.1884*** 0.1692*** 
Notes: The unit of observation is a country-pair in year t, where t ranges from 1948 to 2015. 
The dependent variable in columns (1) and (3) is the natural log of exports of country i to 
country j  in year t,  in columns (2) and (4) – natural log of imports of country i to country j 
in year t. Control variables include log population for i and j, log GDP for i and j, indicator 
for both countries in GATT/WTO, indicator for regional trade agreement, indicator for 
common currency. Standard errors are clustered at the country-pair level.  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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   (0.0194) (0.0274) 
after sanction: t=5   0.1734*** 0.1435*** 
   (0.0189) (0.0279) 
after sanction: t=6   0.186*** 0.1647*** 
   (0.0183) (0.0262) 
after sanction: t=7   0.186*** 0.1988*** 
   (0.0181) (0.0261) 
     
Control variables yes yes yes yes 
Country-pair FE yes yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes yes 
N 788,053 729,759 788,053 729,759 
R-squared 0.336 0.355 0.336 0.355 
 
 
 
 
Which countries does the sanction target intensify its trade relations with? The 
next three subsections offer answers in this regard. 
 
5.2.1 Trade with authoritarian countries 
If a country is sanctioned, it may become constrained in its trading partner choice. 
Being ostracized by the international community, the targeted country may turn 
to trade with authoritarian states that are less troubled by the issues for which the 
country was sanctioned. China’s lack of concern for human rights and democracy 
led sanctioned countries such as Myanmar, Sudan, Zimbabwe and Iran to 
increase economic relations with China when Western countries pulled out (Pegg, 
2012). If there are substitute trading partners that are motivated only by 
economic prospects and do not apply any criteria on democracy and transparency 
to their trade and investment decisions, then a sanctioned country may not need 
to change its behavior and the sanction may lose its bite. Moreover, if the target 
is able to increase engagement with (other) autocratic states, then this would 
undermine the sender’s goals of promoting democracy and respect for human 
Notes: The unit of observation is a country-pair in year t, where t ranges from 1948 to 2015. The 
dependent variable in columns (1) and (3) is the natural log of exports of country i to country j  
in year t,  in columns (2) and (4) – natural log of imports of country i to country j in year t. 
Control variables include log population for i and j, log GDP for i and j, indicator for both 
countries in GATT/WTO, indicator for regional trade agreement, indicator for common 
currency. Standard errors are clustered at the country-pair level.  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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rights, limiting arms and nuclear proliferation or increasing compliance with 
international law (Zweig and Jianhai, 2005). 
In Table 4.5, I examine how the political regime of non-sanctioning trade 
partners of the target affect their trade relationship by interacting the dummies 
for ongoing-sanction and post-sanction periods with a measure for a country’s 
democracy level. To quantify the political orientation of the target’s trade 
partners, I use the Polity IV index (Marshall and Jaggers, 2013). It measures 
political regime type over time on a scale from -10 (autocracy) to 10 (democracy). 
For ease of interpretation and with regard to the practice in the political science 
literature, I construct a time-varying dummy 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 that is equal to one 
whenever the Polity IV index falls below zero and is zero otherwise. The 
interaction term between 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 and 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒_𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 and 
𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 is always negative, revealing that the positive impact of 
trade with non-senders during and after sanction is smaller for non-democratic 
trade partners of the target. This interaction effect is predicted by the empirical 
literature on trade and political regimes – both pairs of autocracies and mixed 
pairs (democracy-autocracy) are found to trade less than democratic pairs 
(Morrow et. al., 1998; Mansfield et. al., 2000; Aidt and Gassebner, 2010). 
Autocratic countries often feature weak domestic institutions that discourage 
trade and autocratic rulers often cater to domestic political elites with strong 
interest in trade protection. 
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TABLE 4. 5: TARGET’S TRADE WITH AUTOCRATIC NON-
SANCTIONING COUNTRIES DURING AND AFTER SANCTION 
 ln exports ln imports 
 (1) (2) 
ongoing sanction for i where j is not the sender 0.0814*** 
(0.0204) 
0.0468** 
(0.0199) 
   
autocratic -0.1151*** 0.0063 
 (0.0179) (0.0190) 
ongoing sanction for i where j is not the sender # 
autocratic 
-0.0687** 
(0.0308) 
-0.0999*** 
(0.0367) 
  
7-year post-sanction period for i where j was not the 
sender 
0.1293*** 
(0.0168) 
0.1112*** 
(0.0177) 
  
7-year post-sanction period for i where j was not the 
sender # autocratic 
-0.0792*** 
(0.0252) 
-0.0306 
(0.0321) 
  
Control variables yes yes 
Country-pair FE yes yes 
Year FE yes yes 
N 701517 668612 
R-squared 0.350 0.380 
 
 
   
 
5.2.2 Trade with geopolitically aligned countries 
There is evidence that countries with similar political ideologies and military allies 
trade more with each other (Dixon and Moon, 1993; Bliss and Russett, 1998; 
Long and Leeds, 2006; Nitsch, 2007; Mityakov et. al, 2013; Berger et. al., 2013). 
According to this line of research, the target may intensify its trade relations with 
countries that are ideologically sympathetic towards its regime or have common 
security goals. 
In order to test for this hypothesis, I examine whether the target intensified its 
exports to and imports from countries with either an ideology similar to that of 
the target or with a military alliance with the target. To measure ideological 
Notes: The unit of observation is a country-pair in year t, where t ranges from 1948 to 2015. 
The dependent variable in column 1 is the natural log of exports of country i to country j  in 
year t,  in column 2 – natural log of imports of country i to country j in year t. Control variables 
include log population for i and j, log GDP for i and j, indicator for both countries in 
GATT/WTO, indicator for regional trade agreement, indicator for common currency. 
Standard errors are clustered at the country-pair level.  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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closeness between states, I use a voting similarity index ranging from 0 to 1 
(increasing in countries’ voting similarity), based on voting data from the UN 
General Assembly (Strezhnev and Voeten, 2017). Data on military alliances 
comes from the Correlates of War Formal Alliance dataset (Gibler, 2008). I use 
a dichotomous variable coded one to signify the existence of a defense pact 
between two countries. 
Armed with these two measures of geopolitical closeness, I introduce them in my 
gravity model by interacting them in separate regressions with the dummies 
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒_𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 and 𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃. Tables 4.6 and 4.7 provide 
the estimation results. In all cases, the coefficient of the interaction with voting 
similarity is negative and statistically significant. The effect of increased trade with 
non-senders decreases with proximity in international politics. The interactions 
with military alliance are not statistically significant, implying that trade 
intensification between the target and non-sanctioning countries does not 
depend on close military ties. These results signal that in the years during and 
after sanction the target does not engage in more trade with geopolitically close 
countries, relative to other years. Yet, the overall effect of UN voting similarity 
and military alliances is positive and statistically significant. This is in line with 
the findings of the literature on the positive impact of political proximity between 
countries and bilateral trade. On the other hand, target countries are often 
sanctioned because of internal or external political instability, such as civil wars, 
territorial disputes, support of terrorism or major human rights violations. These 
types of events represent an additional transaction cost that reduces bilateral 
trade around the time of the event, and the sanction, respectively (Blomberg and 
Hess, 2006; Moser et. al., 2008; Martin et. al., 2008a; Martin et. al., 2008b; Glick 
and Taylor, 2010). 
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TABLE 4. 6: TARGET’S TRADE WITH NON-SANCTIONING 
GEOPOLITICAL ALLIES OF THE TARGET DURING AND AFTER 
SANCTION 
 ln exports ln imports 
 (1) (2) 
ongoing sanction for i where j is not the sender 0.2614*** 
(0.0540) 
0.3047*** 
(0.0684)  
UN voting similarity with target 0.4884*** 
(0.0475) 
0.4649*** 
(0.0482)  
ongoing sanction for i where j is not the sender # 
UN voting similarity with target 
-0.2455*** 
(0.0675) 
-0.3651*** 
(0.0826) 
 
7-year post-sanction period for i where j was not 
the sender 
0.2274*** 
(0.0450) 
0.2633*** 
(0.0659) 
 
7-year post-sanction period for i where j was not 
the sender # UN voting similarity with target 
-0.1642*** 
(0.0550) 
-0.2144*** 
(0.0773) 
   
Control variables yes yes 
Country-pair FE yes yes 
Year FE yes yes 
N 675,033 628,070 
R-squared 0.312 0.332 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The unit of observation is a country-pair in year t, where t ranges from 1948 to 2015. 
The dependent variable in column 1 is the natural log of exports of country i to country j  in 
year t,  in column 2 – natural log of imports of country i to country j in year t. Control variables 
include log population for i and j, log GDP for i and j, indicator for both countries in 
GATT/WTO, indicator for regional trade agreement, indicator for common currency. 
Standard errors are clustered at the country-pair level.  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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TABLE 4. 7: TARGET’S TRADE WITH NON-SANCTIONING 
MILITARY ALLIES OF THE TARGET DURING AND AFTER 
SANCTION 
 ln exports ln imports 
 (1) (2) 
ongoing sanction for i where j is not the sender 0.0612*** 
(0.0161) 
0.0003 
(0.0194)  
military alliance with target 0.0691** 
(0.0324) 
0.0441 
(0.0318)  
ongoing sanction for i where j is not the sender=1 
# military alliance with target 
-0.0549 
(0.0506) 
0.0267 
(0.0502) 
 
7-year post-sanction period for i where j was not the 
sender 
0.1022*** 
(0.0133) 
0.0902*** 
(0.0170) 
 
7-year post-sanction period for i where j was not the 
sender # military alliance with target 
0.0297 
(0.0376) 
0.0428 
(0.0388) 
 
Control variables yes yes 
Country-pair FE yes yes 
Year FE yes yes 
N 788,053 729,759 
R-squared 0.336 0.354 
 
 
 
 
Do sender’s military or political allies support the sender’s stance on sanctions 
and reduce trade with the target? It is possible that the increase in exports and 
imports with non-sanctioning countries is only due to those non-senders that are 
geopolitically detached from the sender. Hence, the target’s increase in trade that 
we observe is not because of stronger trade engagement with its own allies but 
coming from trade intensification with the geopolitical foes of the sender. To test 
for this possibility, I employ in separate regressions the UN voting similarity 
index and the military alliance indicator, but this time between sender and non-
sanctioning countries and interact those measures with the dummies 
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒_𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 and 𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃. Tables 4.8 and 4.9 report the 
results. The coefficients on the interactions of the two geopolitical measures with 
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒_𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 are not statistically significant. However, the interactions 
Notes: The unit of observation is a country-pair in year t, where t ranges from 1948 to 2015. 
The dependent variable in column 1 is the natural log of exports of country i to country j  in 
year t,  in column 2 – natural log of imports of country i to country j in year t. Control variables 
include log population for i and j, log GDP for i and j, indicator for both countries in 
GATT/WTO, indicator for regional trade agreement, indicator for common currency. 
Standard errors are clustered at the country-pair level.  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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with 𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 are statistically significant and positive for exports. 
Thus, I find evidence for differential impact in the post-sanction period based on 
a non-sender country’s political closeness to the sender. The target exports more 
strongly to those countries that are aligned, politically or militarily, with the 
sender. I also find that the differential impact of political alignment is negative 
for imports. For one of the measures of geopolitical proximity – voting similarity 
in the UN – the sign on the interaction coefficient is negative and statistically 
significant. However, this is weaker evidence as the other measure, military 
alliance, turns out to be not statistically significant.   
This opportunistic type of behavior implies that countries that are geopolitically 
close to the sender see the imposition of sanction as a chance to strengthen trade 
with the target during a period of diminished or no competition. Sanctions may 
present an opportunity for non-senders to enter or expand in markets previously 
dominated by the sanction sender (McLean and Whang, 2010).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
142                                                                               Sanctions effect persistence 
 
TABLE 4. 8: TARGET’S TRADE WITH NON-SANCTIONING 
GEOPOLITICAL ALLIES OF THE SENDER DURING AND AFTER 
SANCTION 
 ln exports ln imports 
 (1) (2) 
ongoing sanction for i where j is not the sender -0.0400 
(0.0440) 
0.1049 
(0.0915)  
UN voting similarity with sender -0.146* 
(0.0837) 
0.4584*** 
(0.1412)  
ongoing sanction for i where j is not the sender # 
UN voting similarity with sender 
0.0754 
(0.0597) 
-0.1564 
(0.1112) 
 
7-year post-sanction period for i where j was not the 
sender 
-0.1922*** 
(0.0564) 
0.1835* 
(0.1034) 
 
7-year post-sanction period for i where j was not the 
sender # UN voting similarity with sender 
0.2173*** 
(0.0750) 
-0.2373* 
(0.1252) 
 
Control variables yes yes 
Country-pair FE yes yes 
Year FE yes yes 
N 94,588 80,203 
R-squared 0.312 0.222 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The unit of observation is a country-pair in year t, where t ranges from 1948 to 2015. 
The dependent variable in column 1 is the natural log of exports of country i to country j  in 
year t,  in column 2 – natural log of imports of country i to country j in year t. Control 
variables include log population for i and j, log GDP for i and j, indicator for both countries 
in GATT/WTO, indicator for regional trade agreement, indicator for common currency. 
Standard errors are clustered at the country-pair level.  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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TABLE 4. 9: TARGET’S TRADE WITH NON-SANCTIONING 
MILITARY ALLIES OF THE SENDER DURING AND AFTER 
SANCTION 
 ln exports ln imports 
 (1) (2) 
ongoing sanction for i where j is not the sender 0.0573*** 
(0.0177) 
0.0204 
(0.0215)  
military alliance with sender -0.0559 
(0.0367) 
-0.0374 
(0.0333)  
ongoing sanction for i where j is not the sender # 
military alliance with sender 
0.0347 
(0.0413) 
-0.0254 
(0.0440) 
 
7-year post-sanction period for i where j was not the 
sender 
0.0919*** 
(0.0140) 
0.1043*** 
(0.0183) 
 
7-year post-sanction period for i where j was not the 
sender # military alliance with sender 
0.1071*** 
(0.0396) 
0.0003 
(0.0416) 
 
Control variables yes yes 
Country-pair FE yes yes 
Year FE yes yes 
N 788,053 729,759 
R-squared 0.336 0.354 
 
 
 
 
5.2.3 Trade with export competitors of the sender 
When the US imposed sanctions on Turkey after its invasion of Northern Cyprus 
in 1974, Turkey intensified its trade relations with its other major trading partners 
– France, Germany, Italy and the UK (Navarro, 1978). A US-imposed embargo 
on Iran and Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s diverted the arms trade of 
the two sanction targets towards France and Italy (Kamel, 2016). After the coup 
in Gambia in 1994, sugar exporters France, Germany and Netherlands restricted 
their trade with the country. In response, Gambia increased its sugar imports 
from another sugar exporter, Belgium. A sanction target looks for close 
substitutes with respect to the sanction sender’s trade flows. How common is 
Notes: The unit of observation is a country-pair in year t, where t ranges from 1948 to 2015. 
The dependent variable in column 1 is the natural log of exports of country i to country j  in 
year t,  in column 2 – natural log of imports of country i to country j in year t. Control variables 
include log population for i and j, log GDP for i and j, indicator for both countries in 
GATT/WTO, indicator for regional trade agreement, indicator for common currency. 
Standard errors are clustered at the country-pair level.  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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trade deviation towards countries with similar economic structure as the sanction 
sender? 
To test this idea, I explore non-senders’ export similarity with the sanctioning 
country. In particular, I measure the overlap in two countries’ export baskets – 
the sanction sender and the non-sender – employing the export similarity index 
(Finger and Kreinin, 1979). The index is the sum of the two countries’ minimum 
share in each good for every period: 
𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃
𝑆𝑆,𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆 =  �min(𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒,𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 , 𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒,𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆)
𝑒𝑒
 
where 𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒,𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆  is the share of the sender country’s export value in product p relative 
to all its exports, in year t. The index varies between 0 – countries do not have 
any exports in common – and 1 – the two countries have identical exports 
structure. For the index construction I use data at the two-digit SITC level 
(product-group level data) which comes from UN COMTRADE, with 
corrections made by Hausmann et al. (2011) and made available by the Atlas for 
Economic Complexity project. I use the export similarity index in its continuous 
form and introduce it in my gravity equation (4.2) by interacting it with the 
dummies 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒_𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 and 𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃. In other words, I 
allow the effect of trade with nonsender during and seven years after sanction to 
differ across countries that are more or less similar in their exports to the sanction 
sender. 
The coefficients on the interaction terms are both positive and statistically 
significant (Table 4.10) for the imports of the target. This implies that the 
sanction target reacts with trade diversion to other trading partners that offer 
similar export goods. The effect of intensified trade with competitors of the 
sanction sender continues also after the sanction is lifted. Intuitively, the target 
turns to trade with countries that are likely to be the next best alternative markets. 
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TABLE 4. 10: TARGET’S TRADE WITH NON-SANCTIONING 
COUNTRIES WITH EXPORT STRUCTURE SIMILAR TO THE ONE OF 
THE SENDER, DURING AND AFTER SANCTION 
 ln exports ln imports 
 (1) (2) 
ongoing sanction for i where j is not the sender -0.0048 
(0.0218) 
-0.0198 
(0.0347)  
export similarity with sender 0.8133 
(0.8785) 
-2.2124** 
 (0.9722) 
ongoing sanction for i where j is not the sender # export 
similarity with sender 
0.7042 
(0.7645) 
2.2591*** 
(0.8402) 
 
7-year post-sanction period for i where j was not the 
sender 
-0.0780*** 
(0.0264) 
-0.0162 
(0.0384) 
 
7-year post-sanction period for i where j was not the 
sender # export similarity with sender 
0.2102 
(0.8013) 
1.6412* 
(0.9191) 
Control variables yes yes 
Country-pair FE yes yes 
Year FE yes yes 
N 80525 66475 
R-squared 0.232 0.179 
 
 
 
 
These results speak to a set of results on trade diversion to countries offering 
similar products, in the case of antidumping measures. In particular, numerous 
studies (Prusa, 2001; Konings et. al. 2001; Niels, 2003; Durling and Prusa, 2006; 
Bown and Crowley, 2007; Vandenbussche and Zanardi, 2010) have found that 
starting an antidumping case against another country decreases bilateral exports 
to that country to the benefit of the increased trade of the antidumping defendant 
with other trading partners. Additionally, the initiator of the antidumping case 
also diverts its trade flows towards third parties. However, this deviation does 
not fully account for the lost exports with the antidumping case defendant and 
overall, the net exports of the country imposing antidumping measures decline.  
 
Notes: The unit of observation is a country-pair in year t, where t ranges from 1948 to 2015. 
The dependent variable in column 1 is the natural log of exports of country i to country j  in 
year t,  in column 2 – natural log of imports of country i to country j in year t. Control 
variables include log population for i and j, log GDP for i and j, indicator for both countries 
in GATT/WTO, indicator for regional trade agreement, indicator for common currency. 
Standard errors are clustered at the country-pair level.  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
146                                                                               Sanctions effect persistence 
 
6. Conclusion 
I find evidence that sanction imposition decreases bilateral trade between the 
sender and the target but does not depress target’s total trade. The target diverts 
its trade flows towards non-sanctioning countries. My estimates across the 
different non-sanctioning countries vary substantially, showing that economic 
motives and not political alliances lead to the trade intensification between a 
target and non-senders in the years during and after sanction. My results have 
implications for the empirical research on the impact of (trade-based) sanctions, 
trade disputes and trade wars. I show that a country’s sanction policy has a 
persistent impact on the target’s trade behavior. This is especially significant 
when the target is an important trading partner of the sender.  
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APPENDIX A4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE A4. 1: TREND OF AVERAGE LOG EXPORTS GAP WITH 
THE SYNTHETIC CONTROL METHOD 
Notes: These figures plot the difference between sanctioned countries and a synthetic control 
country consisting of similar countries that did not contemporaneously experience a 
sanction. Sanction cases are grouped according to sanction length. Only sanction cases with 
pre-treatment RMSPE < 0.4 are included. Pre-intervention matching until year -4. The first 
red vertical line denotes the initiation of a sanction, the second one – the end of a sanction. 
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FIGURE A4. 1(CONTINUED): TREND OF AVERAGE LOG EXPORTS 
GAP WITH THE SYNTHETIC CONTROL METHOD 
Notes: Figure continued from previous page  
Sanctions effects persistence  155 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
FIGURE A4. 2: TREND OF AVERAGE LOG IMPORTS GAP WITH THE 
SYNTHETIC CONTROL METHOD 
Notes: These figures plot the difference between sanctioned countries and a synthetic control 
country consisting of similar countries that did not contemporaneously experience a 
sanction. Sanction cases are grouped according to sanction length. Only sanction cases with 
pre-treatment RMSPE < 0.4 are included. Pre-intervention matching until year -4. The first 
red vertical line denotes the initiation of a sanction, the second one – the end of a sanction. 
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FIGURE A4. 2 (CONTINUED): TREND OF AVERAGE LOG EXPORTS 
GAP WITH THE SYNTHETIC CONTROL METHOD 
Notes: Figure continued from previous page  
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FIGURE A4. 3: TREND OF AVERAGE LOG EXPORTS GAP WITH 
THE SYNTHETIC CONTROL METHOD 
Notes: These figures plot the difference between sanctioned countries and a synthetic control 
country consisting of similar countries that did not contemporaneously experience a 
sanction. Sanction cases are grouped according to sanction length. Only sanction cases with 
pre-treatment RMSPE < 0.8 are included. Pre-intervention matching until year -4. The first 
red vertical line denotes the initiation of a sanction, the second one – the end of a sanction. 
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FIGURE A4. 3 (CONTINUED): TREND OF AVERAGE LOG EXPORTS 
GAP WITH THE SYNTHETIC CONTROL METHOD 
Notes: Figure continued from previous page  
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FIGURE A4. 4: TREND OF AVERAGE LOG IMPORTS GAP WITH THE 
SYNTHETIC CONTROL METHOD 
Notes: These figures plot the difference between sanctioned countries and a synthetic control 
country consisting of similar countries that did not contemporaneously experience a 
sanction. Sanction cases are grouped according to sanction length. Only sanction cases with 
pre-treatment RMSPE < 0.8 are included. Pre-intervention matching until year -4. The first 
red vertical line denotes the initiation of a sanction, the second one – the end of a sanction. 
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Notes: Figure continued from previous page  
FIGURE A4. 4 (CONTINUED): TREND OF AVERAGE LOG IMPORTS 
GAP WITH THE SYNTHETIC CONTROL METHOD 
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FIGURE A4. 5: TREND OF AVERAGE LOG EXPORTS GAP WITH THE 
SYNTHETIC CONTROL METHOD 
Notes: These figures plot the difference between sanctioned countries and a synthetic control 
country consisting of similar countries that did not contemporaneously experience a 
sanction. Sanction cases are grouped according to sanction length. All sanction cases 
regardless of pre-treatment fit are included. Pre-intervention matching until year -4. The first 
red vertical line denotes the initiation of a sanction, the second one – the end of a sanction. 
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Notes: Figure continued from previous page  
FIGURE A4. 5 (CONTINUED): TREND OF AVERAGE LOG EXPORTS 
GAP WITH THE SYNTHETIC CONTROL METHOD 
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FIGURE A4. 6: TREND OF AVERAGE LOG IMPORTS GAP WITH THE 
SYNTHETIC CONTROL METHOD 
Notes: These figures plot the difference between sanctioned countries and a synthetic control 
country consisting of similar countries that did not contemporaneously experience a 
sanction. Sanction cases are grouped according to sanction length. All sanction cases 
regardless of pre-treatment fit are included. Pre-intervention matching until year -4. The first 
red vertical line denotes the initiation of a sanction, the second one – the end of a sanction. 
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Notes: Figure continued from previous page  
FIGURE A4. 6 (CONTINUED): TREND OF AVERAGE LOG IMPORTS 
GAP WITH THE SYNTHETIC CONTROL METHOD 
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TABLE A4. 1: LIST OF SANCTION CASES 
Sender Target Start Year End Year 
United States Ecuador 1965 1977 
United States Peru 1965 1977 
France Israel 1967 1974 
United Kingdom Israel 1967 1967 
United States Italy 1968 1971 
United States Japan 1969 1972 
United States Australia 1973 1976 
Libya Netherlands 1973 1974 
United Kingdom Chile 1974 1980 
United States India 1974 1976 
Canada India 1974 1976 
United States Taiwan Province of China 1976 1977 
United States Guatemala 1977 1983 
Canada Japan 1977 1978 
United States Pakistan 1977 1977 
United States Iran, Islamic Republic of 1979 1981 
Japan Iran, Islamic Republic of 1979 1981 
United Kingdom Iran, Islamic Republic of 1979 1981 
Italy Iran, Islamic Republic of 1979 1981 
France Iran, Islamic Republic of 1979 1981 
France Poland 1980 1984 
United States Poland 1980 1984 
Belgium Poland 1980 1984 
United Kingdom Poland 1980 1984 
Germany Poland 1980 1984 
Belgium Russia 1980 1982 
United Kingdom Russia 1980 1982 
United States Israel 1981 1981 
France Italy 1981 1982 
United States Nicaragua 1981 1990 
Germany Turkey 1981 1986 
United Kingdom Turkey 1981 1986 
France Turkey 1981 1986 
United Kingdom Argentina 1982 1989 
Germany Argentina 1982 1989 
Japan Argentina 1982 1989 
United States Argentina 1982 1989 
Germany Canada 1982 1984 
Italy Canada 1982 1984 
Belgium Canada 1982 1984 
United Kingdom Canada 1982 1984 
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France Canada 1982 1984 
United States Germany 1982 1982 
Italy Spain 1982 1984 
Belgium Spain 1982 1984 
France Spain 1982 1984 
United Kingdom Spain 1982 1984 
Germany Spain 1982 1984 
Turkey France 1982 1982 
United States United Kingdom 1982 1982 
Germany Israel 1982 1983 
Belgium United States 1983 1984 
France United States 1983 1984 
Italy United States 1983 1984 
Germany United States 1983 1984 
United States New Zealand 1985 1990 
Canada Germany 1986 1987 
Canada France 1986 1987 
Canada Greece 1986 1987 
Canada Netherlands 1986 1987 
Canada Portugal 1986 1987 
United Kingdom Syrian Arab Republic 1986 1994 
Germany Syrian Arab Republic 1986 1994 
United States Syrian Arab Republic 1986 1994 
Japan China,P.R.: Mainland 1987 1988 
United States Panama 1988 1997 
United States Venezuela, Rep. Bol. 1988 1997 
Germany China,P.R.: Mainland 1989 1990 
France China,P.R.: Mainland 1989 1990 
United Kingdom China,P.R.: Mainland 1989 1990 
Germany Iran, Islamic Republic of 1989 1998 
Sweden Iran, Islamic Republic of 1989 1998 
Germany Japan 1989 1990 
France Haiti 1991 1994 
United States Haiti 1991 1994 
Canada Haiti 1991 1994 
Switzerland Turkey 1991 1992 
United States Colombia 1992 1997 
United States Costa Rica 1992 1997 
United States Spain 1992 1997 
United States Indonesia 1992 1992 
Canada Australia 1993 1995 
Canada Nigeria 1993 1999 
United States Nigeria 1993 1999 
United Kingdom Nigeria 1993 1999 
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Canada New Zealand 1993 1993 
Australia United States 1993 1993 
Germany Korea, Rep. 1994 1996 
New Zealand France 1995 1996 
Japan France 1995 1996 
Australia France 1995 1996 
United States Lebanon 1995 2000 
United States Turkey 1995 1998 
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo Burundi 1996 1999 
Sweden United Kingdom 1996 1999 
Germany United Kingdom 1996 1999 
France United Kingdom 1996 1999 
Netherlands United Kingdom 1996 1999 
Belgium United Kingdom 1996 1999 
Indonesia Australia 1997 1997 
France Iran, Islamic Republic of 1997 1997 
Colombia Japan 1998 1998 
Australia Pakistan 1998 2001 
Germany Pakistan 1998 2001 
Canada Pakistan 1998 2001 
United States Pakistan 1998 2001 
Japan Pakistan 1998 2001 
United States Australia 1999 2001 
United Kingdom Ethiopia 1999 2000 
United States Ethiopia 1999 2000 
Indonesia China,P.R.: Mainland 2000 2000 
Australia Fiji 2000 2001 
United Kingdom Fiji 2000 2001 
New Zealand Fiji 2000 2001 
Canada India 2000 2005 
Indonesia Korea, Rep. 2000 2000 
United Kingdom Liberia 2000 2003 
Indonesia Singapore 2000 2000 
India Pakistan 2001 2003 
Colombia Chile 2002 2006 
China,P.R.: Mainland United States 2002 2003 
Japan Canada 2003 2005 
United States Israel 2004 2005 
Syrian Arab Republic Lebanon 2005 2005 
Thailand Malaysia 2005 2007 
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